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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND 
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM: 
A CASE STUDY OF 





In January 2007, Vincent N. Schiraldi was the head of the District of 
Columbia’s juvenile corrections agency.1  By that time, the agency had 
struggled for decades to comply with a comprehensive consent decree 
aimed at remedying constitutionally deficient conditions of juvenile 
confinement.
2
  In a meeting with the city administrator, Schiraldi was asked 
to describe his top three management problems. 
“My three biggest management problems right now,” Schiraldi said, 
emphasizing right now as if the list might change by the end of the day, 
“are keeping the staff from beating up my kids, figuring out how to cut 
down on the sex-for-overtime trade between managers and the line staff, 
and keeping the court off my back long enough so I can fix this damn 
place.”3 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Oberlin College, 2003.  My 
perspective on these issues is both informed and tainted by my experiences as clerk to the 
D.C. Council’s committee on human services (2005–2006) and chief of budget execution in 
the Office of the City Administrator (D.C.) (2007–2009). 
I owe thanks to Courtney Armour, Natalie Bump, James M. Carter, Paul A. Dawson, 
James Lindgren, Laura Nirider, Mike Rowe, Marc Schindler, Vinny Schiraldi, and Dan 
Tangherlini.  Special thanks to Molly Ptacek Singer and Leigh B. Bienen. 
1 Schiraldi was then in his second year as director.  See Mayor’s Order 2005-20, 
Appointment, Acting Director, Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, 52 D.C. Reg. 
2840 (Mar. 18, 2005). 
2 See Consent Decree, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. July 24, 1986) [hereinafter Jerry M. Consent Decree].  The lawsuit remains active today. 
3 Email from Vincent N. Schiraldi to author (Oct. 13, 2010) (on file with the author) 
(regarding a meeting in 2007); Email from Dan Tangherlini, former City Administrator and 
Deputy Mayor, to author (Jan. 28, 2011) (on file with the author) (regarding the same 
meeting). 
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To unpack that statement is to understand the challenges facing the 
would-be reformer of a juvenile corrections agency subject to a lawsuit.  
Keeping children safe is easier to say than to do.
4
  The difficulty exists 
because public sector management demands a great deal of skill
5
 and 
because the political system introduces considerations—such as the 
imperatives of patronage politics
6
 and the popular appeal of promises to get 
tough on new generations of “radically impulsive, brutally remorseless 
youngsters”7—that sometimes take priority over maintaining safe 
conditions inside a juvenile correctional facility.
8
  Further, any far-reaching 





4 See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR 
REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5, 7 & fig. 2 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/
OurWork/JuvenileJustice/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile Justice/Detention Reform/
NoPlaceForKids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids_Full.pdf (stating that “systemic violence, abuse, and/or 
excessive use of isolation or restraints have been documented” since 2000 in twenty-two 
states and the District). 
5 See generally, e.g., KENNETH H. ASHWORTH, CAUGHT BETWEEN THE DOG AND THE 
FIREPLUG, OR HOW TO SURVIVE PUBLIC SERVICE (2001) (offering an experienced realist’s 
practical advice to the newcomer). 
6 See JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIMENT 
IN CLOSING REFORM SCHOOLS 200 (2d ed., 1998) (referring to county-run training schools, 
where truants were incarcerated in 1970s Massachusetts, and stating: “The true reason for 
their existence—to provide patronage jobs for friends and relatives of county 
commissioners—was clear from a simple scan of staff résumés.  The superintendent of one 
of the schools had degrees in massage and embalming.  The superintendent of another came 
to his position after a stint as a pie salesman.  What they had in common was having worked 
in the campaign of a county commissioner or otherwise endeared themselves to a local 
politician or state legislator.”). 
7 E.g., Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has 
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19 (recounting the effects on public policy of John 
DiIulio’s juvenile superpredator theory, which DiIulio later conceded was “wrong”). 
8 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 6, at 202 (summarizing a 1971 report on Massachusetts 
county training schools where delinquent youths were treated as “truly children in bondage, 
with fewer civil rights than any other group in the Commonwealth, even including inmates 
in our state prisons” (internal quotations omitted)). 
9 See, e.g., id. at 18–19 (stating that Massachusetts reformers successfully introduced 
effective therapeutic programs into the state’s training schools, but that beatings, isolation, 
and other hallmarks of institutional culture persisted; ultimately, the reformers decided to 
close all the state’s training schools).  Missouri’s innovative and very effective approach to 
juvenile corrections is perhaps most remarkable for its rejection of the widely accepted 
purposes of criminal punishment.  See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE 
MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 
6–12 (2010) [hereinafter MISSOURI MODEL], available at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Initiatives/Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative/MOModel/MO_Fullreport_webfinal.pdf 
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At their best, juvenile corrections lawsuits require public officials to 
honor their responsibilities to the troubled children placed in their 
custody.
10
  At their worst, the lawsuits become an interfering distraction, 
prioritizing technical compliance ahead of true reform.
11
  Yet these suits, 
and calls for major reform, exist because the conditions inside juvenile 




This Comment seeks to inform the participants in a lawsuit aimed at 
reforming a juvenile justice system so that they may define a constructive 
role for the court.  To that end, this Comment examines the District of 




From the outset of this type of suit, the plaintiffs may be entirely 
correct that conditions of confinement deprive youths of their rights.  But 
the court and parties must continue the inquiry to assess the real problems 
that make conditions what they are.  This is so because the litigation seeks 
not merely to determine whether conditions fall below constitutional and 
statutory standards, but more importantly to change the agency’s operations 
so it will meet those standards.
14
  Conceivably, the judge or plaintiffs might 
 
(comparing the effectiveness of other states’ juvenile corrections programs with that of 
Missouri); id. at 36–45 (explaining Missouri’s philosophy of youth corrections). 
10 See Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting 
Conditions in Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 732–33 (1998) (“Lawsuits 
reduce population, increase staffing, generate reasonable classification systems, improve 
food, clean up the institution, get staff trained, cause bad staff to get fired, increase medical, 
dental, and mental health care, improve the children’s education, produce alternative 
programs, and perhaps most importantly, reduce the number of youngsters who get hurt.”). 
11 See, e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS 248 (1987) (stating that, in the context 
of lawsuits regarding conditions in adult prisons, “prison officials have been forced to act 
where court edicts contradicted both correctional judgments and operational reality”); Ross 
Sandler & David Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again: Consent Decrees in 
Institutional Reform Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 115, 115–16 (2007) (criticizing the tendency 
to transform consent decrees from flexible and equitable remedies into rigid contracts). 
12 See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ & MARY ANN SCALI, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BEYOND THE WALLS: IMPROVING 
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY, at xi (1998) (calling litigation a 
response to well-documented deficiencies in the conditions of confinement). 
13 See Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 
1985). 
14 See Dale, supra note 10, at 733 (stating that constitutional and statutory constraints 
will limit the extent of relief ordered in juvenile corrections litigation); see also Alphonse 
Gerhardstein, Leveraging Maximum Reform While Enforcing Minimum Standards, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 9, 16, 21 (2009) (arguing that, whenever cooperation with political and 
administrative officials is possible, juvenile corrections litigation should extend its focus 
 
904 WILL SINGER [Vol. 102 
believe that operational issues present problems only for the government 
defendant; this view is correct only if they do not care to implement an 
effective remedy.  The goal of successful implementation introduces a vast 
universe of practical operational problems that merit the attention of the 
court and the parties.
15
  Yet this Comment will argue that the court’s 
interest in operational problems does not justify judicial micromanagement. 
This Comment begins, in Part II, with an overview of the lawsuit and 
consent decree seeking to reform the secure facilities in the District of 
Columbia’s juvenile justice system.  Part III reviews the theoretical 
framework of “institutional reform litigation,” focusing on lawsuits 
challenging conditions of juvenile and criminal confinement.  Much of this 
literature supposes that litigation can solve problems indirectly, by arousing 
a “political will” that in turn solves the problem.  Political will may be a 
necessary condition, but it is far from sufficient. 
Part IV shows that other considerations are important, too.  A wide 
variety of institutional actors react to lawsuits in ways that create barriers to 
and opportunities for reform.  Institutional actors of particular relevance to 
this case include agency management, line staff, judges, the media, the 
legislature, and the chief executive.  Part IV considers each of these groups 
separately.  An epilogue to Part IV emphasizes the potential for political 
considerations to shift in rapid and unexpected ways, testing the durability 
of hard-earned progress after it has been made.  In conclusion, Part V 
develops the implications for how courts and parties should see their own 
roles and the purposes of institutional reform litigation. 
II. JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
In 1985, plaintiffs representing the District’s detained and committed 
youths filed a class action, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia.
16
  The 
 
beyond the minimal adequacy of conditions to promote the adoption of approaches that 
reduce recidivism). 
15 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979) 
[hereinafter Forms of Justice] (stating that implementation of court orders to desegregate 
public schools “required new procedures for the assignment of students; new criteria for the 
construction of schools; reassignment of faculty; revision of the transportation systems to 
accommodate new routes and new distances; reallocation of resources among schools and 
among new activities; curriculum modification; increased appropriations; revision of 
interscholastic sports schedules; new information systems for monitoring the performance of 
the organization; and more” (citations omitted)). 
16 Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519–85 (amended complaint filed Apr. 15, 1986; consent decree 
entered July 24, 1986).  Detained youth are those who are awaiting trial or sentencing; 
committed youth are those who have been adjudicated delinquent and placed in the District’s 
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plaintiffs alleged that practices inside the District’s secure juvenile 
correctional facilities violated their constitutional and statutory rights.
17
  
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
18
 their Fifth 
Amendment due process rights,
19
 and their statutory rights to appropriate 
care
20
 and educational services.
21
  Somewhat unusually, Jerry M. was filed 
and has remained in D.C. Superior Court.
22
 
After extensive discovery and briefing, the parties agreed to a consent 
decree based on three general principles: (1) youths should be housed in the 
least restrictive setting consistent with public safety, their individual needs, 
and constitutional and statutory requirements; (2) youths should not be held 
in secure confinement when a community-based placement is suitable; and 
(3) detained youths placed in secure confinement while awaiting trial 
should remain there for the shortest possible time.
23




custody for up to two years.  District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180 n.3, 4 
(D.C. 1990) (citing D.C. CODE § 16-2320 (LexisNexis 2001)). 
17 Jerry M., 571 A.2d at 180; see also Ed Bruske, Suit Decries Youth Home Conditions, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1985, at A1 (“Youths held at the District’s facilities for juvenile 
delinquents are subjected to vermin-infested housing that would not pass fire inspections, as 
well as beatings from their counselors, inadequate medical attention and insufficient 
educational programs, according to a lawsuit filed against the city. . . .”). 
18 Amended Complaint at 53–55, Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 
1986) [hereinafter Jerry M. Complaint]. 
19 Id. (referencing due process rights to be free from harm, to receive rehabilitative 
treatment, and to access the courts and counsel); cf. Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, 
Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modern Quest for a Historical 
Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1793–94 (1995) (stating that by the mid-1980s the 
prospects for constitutional protection of juveniles’ right to treatment were “drastically 
limited”). 
20 Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 53 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 16-2313(b), -2320 
(LexisNexis 2001)). 
21 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–82 (2006) and D.C. CODE §§ 31-401, -403 (LexisNexis 
2001)). 
22 See Alison Brill, Note, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility 
After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 651–53 (2008) (explaining 
why “federal courts [became] the preferred forum for challenging prison conditions” via 
§ 1983 claims). 
23 See Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 1–2 (stating the decree’s general 
principles); District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180–81 (D.C. 1990) 
(characterizing the discovery and briefing). 
24 Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 51–52 (alleging that the District inappropriately 
confined youths even when public safety and rehabilitative needs did not call for secure 
confinement); id. at 25–26, 36–37, 48–49 (alleging that staff were too few and too poorly 
trained, creating a climate of violence in juvenile confinement facilities). 
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 in juvenile correctional facilities. 
The consent decree’s core provisions followed from its principles.  
The consent decree empowered a panel of three experts to set a binding cap 
on the number of youths confined to locked custody and to plan a 
continuum of community-based alternatives to secure confinement.
27
  It 
required the District to close the notorious Cedar Knoll facility
28
 by 
December 1, 1987, and to obtain the court’s permission before constructing 
additional space for secure rooms.
29
  And it prohibited the District from 
housing more than one child in a cell.
30
 
But the consent decree did not stop there.  It established a court 
monitor to track compliance, mediate disputes between the parties, and 
make recommendations on how to comply with the decree.
31
  Other 




 Staffing.  The consent decree mandated training standards 
for newly hired line staff, created an internal compliance 
unit, required a minimum ratio of one staff on duty to 
supervise every ten youths during the daytime, and 
 
25 On the effects of confining youths unnecessarily, in light of the risk they pose to public 
safety and their rehabilitative needs, see generally BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, 
JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH 
IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES (2006), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_REP_DangersOfDetention_JJ.pdf. 
26 On the effects of confining too many youths in a single facility, see generally Sue 
Burrell, The Human Impact of Crowding in Juvenile Detention, 13 J. FOR JUV. JUST. & 
DETENTION SERVICES 42 (1998), available at http://www.ylc.org/pdfs/Human_
Impact_of_Crowding.pdf. 
27 Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 2–5 pt. I(B)(1)–(6); see also Jerry M. v. 
District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1987) (Memorandum Order 
A) at 6–7 (accepting most of the panel’s recommendations and ordering the District to 
comply). 
28 See, e.g., Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 5 (“Cedar Knoll is an antiquated 
‘reform school’ whose buildings have become unfit for habitation. . . .”). 
29 Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 7–8 (referring to Cedar Knoll as the “Oak 
Hill Annex”). 
30 Id. at 7–8. 
31 Id. at 8–12.  The court monitor “shall have access to all D.C. employees[,] . . . all 
appropriate facilities[, and] all relevant records.”  Id. at 9. 
32 The consent decree stopped short of setting appropriations.  See id. at 12 (“The Mayor 
of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Public Schools will take all 
reasonable steps, employing their utmost diligence, to seek funds sufficient to implement 
fully the provisions of this Decree.”). 
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required the District to discipline staff as appropriate 
while limiting their overtime.
33
 
 Individual Service Plans.  The decree detailed procedures 




 Recreation and Aftercare.  The decree fixed minimum 
amounts of daily exercise
35




 Mental Health and Social Services.  The decree specified 
staff-to-youth ratios and educational qualifications for 
mental health professionals and social workers.
37
 
 Education.  The decree required full compliance with the 
federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act;
38
 set 
different teacher-to-student ratios for regular academic 
classes, special education classes, and classes for seriously 
emotionally disturbed youths; required use of the standard 
D.C. Public Schools curriculum; required an 
administrative structure consisting of a principal and 
assistant principal as well as a roster of available substitute 
teachers; required at least five hours of school each day; 
and required vocational programming.
39
 
 Discipline.  The decree revised the existing disciplinary 
code by reducing the maximum punishment from seven to 
five days of isolation, during which time educational and 
recreational services must continue.
40
 
 Use of Restraints.  The decree limited the use of restraints 
by enumerating the circumstances in which a youth could 
wear leg irons or handcuffs and requiring a standardized 





33 Id. at 13–14. 
34 Id. at 14–20.  It required, inter alia, a team leader to “supervise the cottage life staff 
with respect to all areas of the youth’s [individualized service plan].”  Id at 9. 
35 Id. at 20–21 (requiring “large muscle activity” for a minimum of two hours, including 
one hour outdoors, weather permitting). 
36 Id. at 23–24.  Aftercare refers to supervision of the youth after leaving locked custody. 
37 Id. at 21–23. 
38 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006). 
39 Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 24–27. 
40 Id. at 28–30. 
41 Id. at 30–32. 
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 Environmental Health and Safety.  The decree regulated 
youths’ access to bathrooms and required adherence to 
standards for food, housekeeping, laundry, waste disposal, 
vermin control, plumbing, temperature controls, fire 
safety, and the size of each room.
42
 
 Medical Services and Family/Attorney Contact.  The 
decree required adequate onsite medical services and 




 Student Handbook.  The decree required the agency to 
publish all of the youths’ rights and facilities’ rules in a 




Throughout the consent decree, provisions fixed deadlines or required 
the District to develop timetables for achieving compliance.
45
  One 
provision stated that the decree would remain in effect—and thus that court 
supervision would continue—until the monitor found “sustained and 
satisfactory implementation and substantial compliance in all areas of the 
Decree.”46 
If the parties hoped that the decree’s specificity would facilitate 
compliance, they would be disappointed.  During much of the case’s 
history, the government’s attempts to comply with the 1986 consent decree 
were insincere and ineffectual.
47
  The District violated even central, 
straightforward terms.  For example, despite the clear mandate to close the 
Cedar Knoll facility by December 1, 1987, the District continued to operate 
 
42 Id. at 33–36. 
43 Id. at 37–39. 
44 Id. at 39–40. 
45 E.g., id. at 33 (requiring the District to comply with environmental health standards by 
August 1, 1988, and to produce a timetable for compliance with all requirements within two 
weeks of the consent decree taking effect). 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 See REAGAN DALY ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL CHANGE: A PROCESS 
EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON, DC’S SECURE JUVENILE PLACEMENT REFORM 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=3191/Capital-Change-process-evaluation-
DC-FINAL2.pdf; Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 19, at 1824 (calling the District’s juvenile 
justice system “an abject failure” despite nearly a decade of court intervention). 
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the facility—even reopening portions that it had closed48—until an act of 
Congress barred any appropriations for its operation after June 1, 1993.
49
 
At various moments, a frustrated court issued remedial orders to 
enforce the decree,
50
 attempted to define the District’s obligations in further 
detail than the decree specified,
51
 found the District in civil contempt,
52
 
awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs,53 levied several million dollars in fines 
for noncompliance with the decree and remedial orders,
54
 appointed a series 
 
48 See Patrice Gaines-Carter, Cedar Knoll Population Up, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1985, at 
B1 (stating that, in the preceding five months, “the number of youths there has quadrupled 
and officials are reopening cottages”). 
49 Keith A. Harriston, D.C. to Close Cedar Knoll by May 31, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1993, 
at A28 (referencing an act introduced by Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.), whose district 
included the facility); News Brief, D.C. Empties Detention Center, WASH. POST, June 2, 
1993, at D5.  Congress had previously defunded all appropriations for the facility known as 
Cedar Knoll, but the District renamed the reopened cottages “Oak Hill Annex” and kept 
operating them.  LISA FELDMAN, MICHAEL MALES & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS 
FOR YOUTH, A TALE OF TWO JURISDICTIONS: YOUTH CRIME AND DETENTION RATES IN 
MARYLAND AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 11 (2001), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/tale_of_2.pdf. 
50 The first judge presiding over Jerry M. issued eighteen remedial orders, labeled from 
A to R, between 1986 and 1994; his successor labeled such orders with numbers, thus 
sparing the District “the embarrassment of receiving Memorandum Order Z.”  Holland & 
Mlyniec, supra note 19, at 1823 n.232.  “There have been orders to remedy violations of the 
consent decree in medical care, education, environmental issues, physical abuse, lack of 
programming, and overcrowding, to name a few.”  Michael White et al., Symposium, 
Systemic Critique and Transformation, 3 D.C. L. REV. 403, 412 (1995) (quoting Donna 
Wulkan, co-counsel to the Jerry M. plaintiffs). 
51 District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180 (D.C. 1990) (reversing, “with 
some reluctance,” trial court orders that exceeded the scope of the consent decree).  The 
court invalidated orders that the District construct smaller, decentralized facilities to replace 
its existing secure institutions; place no more than sixty committed youths in secure 
facilities; and institute wide-ranging management reforms.  Id. at 179–80, 189–90. 
52 Id. at 192 (affirming the trial court’s finding of contempt).  The District “failed to 
comply with practically every provision of the Decree,” including mandates to close Cedar 
Knoll, reduce the number of youths in secure confinement, and end the practice of housing 
more than one youth in a single room.  Id. at 184 n.16 (quoting the trial court’s 
Memorandum Order D, dated November 28, 1988). 
53 District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 580 A.2d 1270, 1273, 1282 (D.C. 1990). 
54 E.g., Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. April 15, 
2004) (Order VIII) at 21–22 (establishing fines of $1,000 per day for failure to train staff in 
making educational diagnoses, $1,000 per day for failure to convene treatment teams to 
develop and review educational plans, $1,000 per day for failure to fully implement a policy 
requiring treatment team leaders to supervise line staff in all areas of a youth’s treatment 
plan, and $5,000 per day for failure to establish a pre-release unit outside the perimeter fence 
at Oak Hill); see also Nancy Lewis, Judge’s Costly Ruling, WASH. POST, April 22, 1994, at 
D1 (reporting the court’s imposition of a $1,000 fine per youth per day for overcrowding at 
juvenile institutions).  In imposing the fines rather than appointing a receiver, the court 
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of court monitors and special masters,
55
 attempted to appoint a receiver in 
charge of youth offenders’ education,56 and even summoned the mayor to a 
“closed-door meeting about the District’s trouble-plagued juvenile 
facilities.”57 
None of these actions resulted in compliance with the decree.
58
  In 
2004, the court monitor gave a “dispiriting” assessment in his fifty-second 
(and final) report: “Unfortunately, much of the halting, stutter-step, 
movement toward compliance seen for much of the past eighteen years 
continued.”59  The plaintiffs asked the court to place the entire juvenile 
justice agency in receivership.
60
  Before the court ruled on the motion—and 
with every indication that the court intended to grant it
61—the parties agreed 
instead to appoint a new special arbiter with both expanded powers to 
 
hoped that “with the right incentives[,] compliance may be achieved without substituting a 
court officer for government officials.”  Id. at D5 (quoting Judge Ricardo M. Urbina). 
55 E.g., White et al., supra note 50, at 413 (noting the existence, at the time, of a court 
monitor and separate special masters for suicide prevention, and development of a 
continuum of care). 
56 The D.C. Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s order appointing an educational 
receiver.  District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206, 1213–14 (D.C. 1999) (holding 
that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing the receiver because it considered only 
a single factor—“[t]he District’s abysmal response to its mandates for such a protracted 
period of time”—without making findings with respect to other relevant factors, including 
the prospects for better compliance under newly appointed management). 
57 Nancy Lewis, Kelly to Skip Meeting on Youth Facilities, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1993, 
at B5 (reporting that Judge Urbina invited the mayor, but also required the director of the 
Department of Human Services to attend).  Mayor Sharon Pratt (née Kelly) declined the 
invitation, citing her concern for the separation of powers and her “ability as chief executive 
to function through executive agencies.”  Id.  The director, Vincent C. Gray, became mayor 
in 2011 and surely has an opinion on the separation of powers. 
58 See AUSTIN A. ANDERSEN, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (D.C.), OIG NO. 03-
0014YS, YOUTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION PART ONE: OAK HILL YOUTH CENTER 22 (Mar. 
30, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology) (stating that “many of 
the same types of problems that resulted in the 1986 lawsuit against the District and the 
subsequent Decree . . . still exist 17 years later,” and reporting that, as of October 2003, the 
District “still was not in full compliance with approximately one-third of the 185 provisions 
of the Decree”). 
59 Fifty-Second Report of the Monitor at 1–2, Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 8, 2004). 
60 See Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004) (order approving 
memorandum of agreement providing for a special arbiter) at 1. 
61 Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. issued a scathing order the previous month, concluding: “It 
is bewildering to this member of the court that over three years after the renewed pledges to 
achieve compliance with the Consent Decree . . . defendants continue to address fundamental 
provisions of the Consent Decree in isolation, with a flurry of attention prior to or following 
court involvement.”  Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2004) (Order 
VIII) at 20. 
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monitor implementation of the decree and new authority to make a binding 




At the same time, the legislature reorganized the juvenile corrections 
agency by making it a cabinet-level agency whose director reported directly 
to the mayor.
63
  Together, the new agency and special arbiter constituted a 
last-ditch effort that appeared likely, at best, to postpone receivership.
64
  
Receivership appeared not only an inevitable outcome of the litigation, but 
the only way to improve the District’s juvenile correctional institutions; a 
plaintiff’s expert even advised the agency’s new director to plan for it.65 
And then something miraculous happened.
66
  After decades of 
recalcitrance, the District—pushed by pressure from the public and 
politicians, and pulled by a team of reform-oriented administrators—made 
the kind of dramatic progress that had eluded consent decrees, 
 
62 Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004) (order approving 
memorandum of agreement providing for a special arbiter).  The special arbiter, Grace M. 
Lopes, had previously served as the general counsel to Mayor Anthony A. Williams.  Thus, 
the court monitor wrote in his final report that “the appointment of a Special Arbiter . . . who 
has worked with the current Mayor, and who, therefore, will have access to him, and his 
considerable authority, when necessary, are both indications that the future may offer more 
promise than the past.”  Fifty-Second Report of the Monitor, supra note 59, at 1. 
63 See Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services Establishment Act of 2004, 52 D.C. 
Reg. 2025, D.C. Law 15-335 (Apr. 12, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 2-1515.01–2-
1515.10 (LexisNexis 2001)).  Previously, the agency had been known as the Youth Services 
Administration (YSA), a division of the larger Department of Human Services.  Today it is 
the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS).  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
64 See Theola S. Labbé, Acting Chief Articulates His Juvenile Justice Plan, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 26, 2005, at B3 (“Peter J. Nickles, an attorney for juveniles in the Jerry M. Consent 
Decree, testified [to the city council] that Schiraldi’s nomination and the creation of the 
Cabinet-level Youth Rehabilitation Services Department were reasons he had not pushed for 
the District’s juvenile justice system to be put into receivership . . . . ‘If it’s not done this 
time, there won’t be any other option but to take the system away from the District,’ Nickles 
said.”).  Nickles was later appointed the District’s attorney general, a position he held from 
2008 to 2010.  See infra text accompanying note 368. 
65 See Vincent N. Schiraldi, Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences, Committee 
on Assessing Juvenile Justice (Oct. 12, 2010), at 2 (on file with the author) (stating that Paul 
DeMuro, a veteran of several reform efforts nationwide and the Jerry M. saga, believed that 
receivership was inevitable and advised Schiraldi to “develop a strategy to get appointed 
Receiver because that was the only way we’d ever fix this place”) [hereinafter Remarks]. 
66 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 178 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter HUMAN 
CONDITION] (“The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws 
and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the 
new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle.  The fact that man is capable of 
action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what 
is infinitely improbable.”). 
912 WILL SINGER [Vol. 102 
memorandum orders, court monitors, and contempt findings.  Some of the 
changes were programmatic, such as the District’s full integration of 
therapeutic treatment with the educational programming for youths in 
secure confinement.
67
  Other changes were more concrete: the District met a 
statutory deadline to replace the dilapidated Oak Hill Youth Center with the 
state-of-the-art New Beginnings Youth Development Center, a facility 
where therapeutic principles “are embodied both in the programming and 
the physical environment.”68 
Though the lawsuit remains active, there is no denying that the 
District’s juvenile correctional facilities became vastly more humane in a 
relatively short time.
69
  By December 2007, the plaintiffs were so 
encouraged by the agency’s improvements that they withdrew their motion 
to appoint a receiver.
70
  The District even became a model of reform for 
other jurisdictions with troubled juvenile correctional systems.
71
 
If juvenile justice reform can happen in the District of Columbia, it can 
happen anywhere.
72
  This Comment examines the interaction between the 
lawsuit and actual reform.  From the perspectives of several role-players 
with distinct interests, this Comment demonstrates that overly abstract 
views of institutional reform litigation gloss over complex practical 
challenges of the highest importance.  The District’s frustrating experience 
of judicially driven efforts suggests that this case study can illuminate some 
of the real obstacles to reform and ways in which court intervention 
addressed or ignored those obstacles.  Finally, the District’s tiny scale 
 
67 DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 16. 
68 Id. at 15; see also Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004, § 1102, 52 D.C. Reg. 1188, 
D.C. Law 15-261 (effective Mar. 17, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE § 24-941 (LexisNexis 
2001)) (establishing a statutory mandate to close Oak Hill). 
69 Vincent N. Schiraldi, Op-Ed, In D.C., A Promise Kept in Juvenile Justice, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at C5 (quoting plaintiffs’ counsel’s 2008 assessment that DYRS “has 
made more progress toward achieving the goals of the Consent Decree in the past three years 
than we had seen in the previous 20 years of this lawsuit”). 
70 E.g., DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 4, n.15. 
71 See, e.g., Radio: Robert Wildeboer, Inside and Out: Building a New Prison Culture in 
D.C. (WBEZ 91.5 FM broadcast June 16, 2010), available at http://www.wbez.org/series/
inside-and-out (audio recording and written transcript) (examining the District’s reform 
effort for lessons applicable to Illinois). 
72 Over the course of its involvement in a host of institutional reform lawsuits, which 
date as far back as 1974 and include seven that are active today, the District has earned a 
reputation for being impossible to reform.  See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, Getting the Courts to 
Stop Governing D.C., WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/38334/getting-the-courts-to-stop-governing-
dc; see also infra note 162 (summarizing the District’s unsuccessful attempt to terminate the 
suits in 2010). 
2012] JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM 913 
narrows the number of factors bearing on the opportunities and barriers that 




III. THE IDEAS IN THE BACKGROUND 
In the abstract, judicial intervention seems like an appealing route to 
reform.  Institutional reform litigation presents courts with a variety of 
available remedies that might be appropriate, depending on the suit’s 
context.
74
  Accordingly, this Part begins by briefly mentioning modern 
tenets of juvenile corrections reform.  This Part then proceeds to consider 
evolving theories of institutional reform litigation, with an eye towards 
prisons and juvenile facilities. 
A. OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM 
Juvenile corrections exists in tension with the adult prison system.  
Juvenile justice systems are creatures of Progressive Era statutes growing 
from a belief that the state’s interest in rehabilitating delinquent juveniles is 
fundamentally different from its need to punish hardened adult criminals.
75
  
Yet comparisons with the adult system are inevitable, and the reemergence 
of the notion that serious offenders should be punished severely no matter 
their age has returned with profound effects on juvenile justice.
76
 
All too often, incarcerated youths are subjected to conditions that are 
difficult, if not brutal.  Incarcerated youths may suffer beatings from staff or 
other youths.
77
  Corporal punishment may be rendered against a youth who 
 
73 Cf. White et al., supra note 50, at 418 (expressing Jerome Miller’s belief that “reform 
should not be all that difficult,” particularly in the District, because there are relatively few 
people in the juvenile justice system and because institutions are expensive to operate 
compared to community-based alternatives to incarceration). 
74 See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 86–91 (1978) [hereinafter CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION] (arguing that courts should use the remedy appearing most likely to 
succeed under the circumstances, instead of disfavoring equitable remedies unless there is no 
adequate remedy at law). 
75 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1967); see also David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. 
Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to 
Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 645–46 (2002) (describing the 
origins of the Illinois Juvenile Court, the first in the nation).  To the extent that juvenile court 
acts create statutory rights, they can impose higher standards on the conditions of 
confinement than the minimal Eighth Amendment standards. 
76 See, e.g., Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 641–42 (referencing the contribution 
of rhetoric about unrepentant juvenile “superpredators” to the limits placed on juvenile court 
jurisdiction in the 1990s). 
77 Interviews conducted in 2003 of a nationally representative sample found that 40% of 
youths in locked custody reported being afraid of being physically attacked by someone, 
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acts out
78
 or against an entire unit collectively if one member acts out.
79
  
Youths may be put on “lockdowns,” in which they are confined to the 




While improving the conditions of confinement is certainly on the 
agenda, it is not the top priority for some leading juvenile justice 
reformers.
81
  Instead, “[t]he most urgent need is to reduce our wasteful, 
counterproductive overreliance on incarceration and detention, and instead 
to redirect resources into proven strategies that cost less, enhance public 
safety, and increase the success of youth who come in contact with the 
juvenile courts.”82  In other words, this approach involves keeping court-
involved youths out of secure confinement except when they truly belong 
there. 
For youths who appropriately belong in secure confinement, reformers 
seek to create environments focused on rehabilitation; Missouri has 
 
27% feared attacks from staff, and 25% from other youths.  ANDREA J. SEDLAK & KARLA S. 
MCPHERSON, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, CONDITIONS OF 
CONFINEMENT: FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 1–2, 7 
tbl.5 (May 2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227729.pdf.  With 
respect to the District, see, e.g., Barton Gellman, Abuse by Staff is Reported at Oak Hill, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1989, at A1 (reporting that serious violence did not appear to be 
routine, but that incidents created a climate where “violence is feared and expected” by 
youths and staff alike). 
78 Gellman, supra note 77 (reporting that an organized group of staff beat misbehaving 
youths on various occasions using “a brick, a knife, metal implements, a chair, milk cartons, 
and their fists”). 
79 E.g., Benjamin Weiser, Youth Facility Policy, Reality Clash, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 
1985, at A1 [hereinafter Youth Facility Policy] (stating that staff administered “a hideously 
painful punishment” to an entire unit of youths for two hours because “somebody had 
thrown salt into somebody’s hair in the dining room”).  
80 E.g., White et al., supra note 50, at 415 (stating that at Oak Hill, lockdowns could last 
up to seven hours at a time, either for disciplinary reasons or because there are not enough 
staff on the unit). 
81 E.g., MENDEL, supra note 4, at 28–37 (listing six priorities for juvenile justice reform, 
of which only the fifth priority pertains to conditions of confinement).  The Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, a national advocacy organization that also has major initiatives in education and 
child welfare, observed that “among all of the policy areas affecting vulnerable children and 
families, juvenile justice probably suffers the most glaring gaps between best practice and 
common practice, between what we know works and what our public systems most often do 
on our behalf.”  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF: REFORM THE NATION’S JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF], available 
at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/PublicationFiles/Juvenile_Justice_issuebrief3.pdf. 
82 ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 1. 
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developed a system that epitomizes this approach.
83
  In the “Missouri 
model,” secure facilities are small and homelike settings, rather than large, 
impersonal institutions.
84
  Staff members maintain safety and order by 
developing relationships with youths, instead of through extensive use of 
isolation and overreliance on sophisticated surveillance technology.
85
  More 
generally, the role of staff goes far beyond mere supervision and seeks to 
facilitate the positive development of youths.
86
 
Though these approaches are very different from traditional 
incarceration practices, they do not represent a set of brand new ideas but 
instead advocate a “return to the roots” of juvenile justice systems.87  
Likewise, conditions litigation in this field seeks to correct the abuses of 
wayward institutions and to restore the rehabilitative purpose envisioned at 
the time juvenile justice systems were created by statute.
88
 
B. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION IN THEORY 
Like institutional reform lawsuits themselves, scholarly consideration 
of this subject is only a few decades old.
89
  As this Part will show, the early 
scholarship sought to develop a framework for understanding late-twentieth 
century judicial interventions that used wide-ranging injunctive remedies to 
address public policy problems.
90
  As these lawsuits proliferated, backlash 
followed; critics questioned both the efficacy and the legitimacy of the 
 
83 See, e.g., Mark Soler, Dana Schoenberg & Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons 
for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 525 (2009). 
84 MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 2. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Jeffrey M. Y. Hammer, Hon. Curtis Heaston & Diane N. Walsh, Denying Child 
Welfare Services to Delinquent Teens: A Call to Return to the Roots of Illinois’ Juvenile 
Court, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 925, 929 (2005) (citing Julian W. Mack, The Chancery 
Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 310, 310 (1925)) 
(discussing the approach of the early Illinois Juvenile Court, which looked beyond simple 
adjudication of guilt to determine and address the reasons why a youth offended). 
88 See, e.g., U.S. v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 974–75, 979 (D.D.C. 1971) (finding that 
overcrowded conditions at a D.C. correctional center violated the essentially rehabilitative 
purpose of the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010–16 (repealed by Pub. L. 98-473, 
98 Stat. 2027 (Oct. 27, 1984)), which provided separately for low-level adult offenders under 
age twenty-two). 
89 Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison 
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 552, 564 (2006) (dating institutional reform litigation 
to the 1955 decision in Brown v. Board and scholarly attention to the “canonical treatments” 
of the topic by Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss in the 1970s). 
90 See generally, e.g., FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 74 (considering the 
civil rights injunction as a device for making policy in various contexts). 
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lawsuits.
91
  Institutional reform lawsuits, especially over jails and prisons, 
fell out of newspapers and law journals alike; however, they had not 
disappeared, but rather changed in ways scholars generally failed to 
appreciate.
92
  Some contemporary defenders emphasize litigation’s ability 
to break up a malevolent institutional order.
93
  While having some merit, 
this perspective glosses over the difficulty of building a new institutional 
culture because it supposes that reform will happen as soon as politicians 
want it to happen.
94
  As other defenders have argued, understanding the 
actual and often peculiar bureaucratic and political factors in play is a task 
of the highest importance.
95
 
1. Origins of Institutional Reform Litigation 
First, it will be useful to summarize the arc of institutional reform 
litigation and its antecedent, public law litigation.  “Public law litigation” is 
Professor Chayes’s term, referring broadly to cases where “the subject 
matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about 
private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.”96  
These suits persist after the court has ordered a remedy; the court remains 
involved to ensure that compliance with an injunction or decree honors the 
public rights that have been violated.
97
  Professor Chayes broadly applied 
 
91 E.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons and 
Jails, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 281, 291, 317 (John DiIulio ed., 
1990) [hereinafter What Judges Can Do] (granting that prison litigation contributed to 
improvements in prison conditions, but suggesting that the improvements would have 
happened in a less disruptive manner without court intervention); id. at 319–20 (arguing that 
judicial intervention in prison administration is inappropriate). 
92 See Schlanger, supra note 89, at 553–57 (refuting the conventional wisdom that prison 
litigation withered during the 1980s and died in 1996 with passage of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act). 
93 E.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2004) (understanding “public law cases 
as core instances of ‘destabilization rights’—rights to disentrench an institution that has 
systematically failed to meet its obligations and remained immune to traditional forces of 
political correction”). 
94 See id. at 1073 (supposing that “experimentalist” approaches to crafting remedies in 
institutional reform suits will expose noncompliance, bringing broader scrutiny to 
institutions and spurring political branches to intervene). 
95 See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 639, 646 (1993) (“Too often, scholars and advocates ignore [the political context 
surrounding the institutions subject to litigation] and offer overarching generalizations about 
litigation’s impact and potential.”). 
96 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1302 (1976). 
97 Id. 
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his term to include suits enforcing public rights against the government 
(such as school desegregation cases and suits over substandard conditions 
in prisons or mental institutions), as well as those enforcing public rights 
against private parties (including antitrust, corporate governance, consumer 
protection, and housing discrimination).
98
  In the course of these suits, the 
judge assumes an extraordinary role in ordering complex injunctive relief 
and supervising its implementation by the defendant.
99
 
Institutional reform litigation is a subset of public law litigation in 
which plaintiffs, typically joined as a class, seek enforcement of their public 
rights against the government.
100
  In the prototypical decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education, the Court’s remand gave district courts broad license 
to enter orders and decrees that would desegregate public schools.
101
  In one 
view, which is not terribly troubled by the separation of powers and 
federalism objections raised against it, a heroic judge can reform the system 
by ordering the policies that politicians were afraid to make.
102
  In the early 
1970s, federal courts began entering the first orders broadly aimed at 
reforming conditions in adult prisons and jails.
103
  Though falling short of 
the most ambitious reform goals, these suits helped improve some of the 
most dramatically deficient conditions; they also prompted the 
professionalization and bureaucratization of prison systems.
104
  Some other 
suits sought to improve juvenile facilities, but they were fewer in number; 




98 Id. at 1284.  For a critique of the increasing use of federal criminal prosecutions to 
force corporate defendants to undertake internal reforms, see Brandon L. Garrett, Structural 
Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007). 
99 FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 74, at 26–27; Chayes, supra note 96, at 
1301. 
100 Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
428, 428 (1977). 
101 See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 89, at 552 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 
Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)); cf. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954) (“Courts are without power to supervise prison 
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations . . . .  No 
authorities are needed to support th[is] statement[].”). 
102 See FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 74, at 90, 93; Fiss, Forms of Justice, 
supra note 15, at 2. 
103 Schlanger, supra note 89, at 552 n.4. 
104 Sturm, supra note 95, at 665–69, 674. 
105 Id. at 698. 
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2. Backlash Against Institutional Reform Litigation 
The golden age of institutional reform litigation did not last long 
before commentators counterattacked against the suits.
106
  First, these critics 
charged that court supervision usurped the executive’s authority to manage 
prisons and the legislature’s authority to set standards and appropriate 
funds.
107
  As a practical matter, there is almost no check or restraint on the 
power assumed by judges and masters.
108
  If they seek to avoid contempt, 
the executive and legislature have no choice but to comply with orders to 
build new facilities, hire more staff, or create procedural rights for 
inmates.
109
  A consent decree is unappealable by definition, since both 
parties agreed to the court’s entry of the settlement; likewise, a master’s 
determinations are effectively final because the trial court rarely reverses its 
own representative, who defendants may not wish to antagonize.
110
  In 
addition, critics charged that federal judges conducting sweeping reviews of 
the management of state institutions had exceeded the bounds of federalism 
and ignored the separation of powers principle.
111
  But as part of a broader 
defense of prison litigation, some argued that judicial policymaking is a 
necessary consequence of the courts’ legitimate adjudication of Eighth 
Amendment rights and the concomitant implementation of remedies.
112
 
Even if we assume that court intervention is legitimate, there may be 
several reasons to doubt its effectiveness.
113
  Whether courts have the right 
 
106 Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1037 (referring to a “backlash” in the late 1980s); 
Schlanger, supra note 89, at 564. 
107 E.g., DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS, supra note 11, at 229. 
108 A judge’s order can only be appealed (if at all) to another judge.  The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, discussed infra, underscores the power legislatures have to stop the 
flow of institutional reform lawsuits. 
109 See, e.g., Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and 
Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 317–18 (2010) (noting 
that a consent decree, unlike a settlement, is an order of the court; the court’s interest in 
enforcement is independent of the parties’ interests, legal or otherwise). 
110 See Clair A. Cripe, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: A Practitioner’s View, 
in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 268, 274–75. 
111 See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent 
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1140–41 (1996).  Of 
course, in the District of Columbia the principles of federalism hardly constrain the federal 
courts.  See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Judicial Activism or Judicial Necessity: The D.C. 
District Court’s Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685, 686 (2002). 
112 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE 380–81 (1998). 
113 Alternatively, one could simply assume that litigation is effective.  See GORDON 
SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE 21 (2009) (charging that policy entrepreneurs, politicians, and 
lawyers act on such an assumption without empirical evidence). 
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tools to change complex institutions—or use the tools they have in the right 
ways—is a matter of some controversy.  John DiIulio charged that a judge 
sitting in chambers is helpless to implement change or even understand the 
basic operations of a distant institution.
114
  Even the assistance of special 
masters is not helpful if courts make poor use of them—for example, by 
appointing as masters individuals (often trained as lawyers) who lack 
correctional expertise.
115
  Ideally, judges themselves are selected because 
they are outstanding lawyers, not strong managers, and so the special 
master might lack sound guidance.
116
  Lastly, ongoing court supervision 
entails high costs in attorney fees and masters’ expenses, which can 
generate skepticism about whether the attorneys and masters are interested 
in solving problems or in perpetuating their incomes.
117
 
With respect to prison litigation, these counterattacks on legitimacy 
and effectiveness—combined with the perceived avalanche of prisoners’ 
meritless pro se suits—led Congress to enact the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA).
118
  Although the PLRA facilitated the dismissal of existing 
prison lawsuits and frustrated the initiation of new ones, prison litigation 
endures.
119
  Notably, the PLRA applies to litigation over conditions in 
juvenile justice facilities, even though juvenile lawsuits have not flooded 




114 See DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS, supra note 11, at 229.  For a vigorous criticism of 
DiIulio’s views on judicial intervention and ideal prison management, see Sturm, supra note 
95, at 657–60. 
115 See Cripe, supra note 110, at 274 (conceding that special masters typically have other 
skills—including an ability to mediate conflicts—that can have value in implementation). 
116 See id. at 274.  In addition to management skills, successful implementation of an 
institutional reform order requires an understanding of local political sensibilities—another 
quality that judges might not have.  See Sturm, supra note 95, at 646. 
117 See DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS, supra note 11, at 216. 
118 Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996); see Margo Schlanger & 
Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for 
Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 141 (2008); see also 
Schlanger, supra note 89, at 556 (stating that progressive policymakers incorrectly assumed 
that prison litigation had declined before the PLRA, so that there was diminished value in 
continuing prison litigation). 
119 Schlanger, supra note 89, at 554–55.  Even after the PLRA, modern-day consent 
decrees involving juvenile facilities can be just as broad as that in Jerry M.  See, e.g., 
Gerhardstein, supra note 14, at 19–20 (listing the guiding principles of a 2008 consent 
decree involving Ohio’s juvenile justice system). 
120 Schlanger & Shay, supra note 118, at 152; see also Anna Rapa, Comment, One Brick 
Too Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act As a Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 
23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263, 273–74 (2006). 
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3. Modern Institutional Reform Litigation 
The PLRA and the theoretical backlash against institutional reform 
litigation did more to diminish scholarly commentary for a few years than 
to block the suits themselves.
121
  Still, some recent commentators have 




Most importantly for present purposes, Sabel and Simon argue that the 
implementation of remedies has moved beyond the traditional “command-
and-control” model, in which the judge directs institutional reforms by 
issuing detailed, regulation-style orders that the bureaucracy must 
execute.
123
  Instead, modern courts tend to adopt an “experimentalist” 
approach, in which all parties (including advocates for the institution’s 
clients) collaborate to craft consensus-driven remedies.
124
  On this view, 
public law litigation enforces a “destabilization right”—that is, a right to 
destabilize the political order that has led an institution to a dysfunctional 
breaking point.
125
  In the juvenile justice context, line staff may beat 
children because they want control of the institution, and politicians may 
allow this state of affairs to persist because they are unwilling to offend the 
staff’s labor union and because the political process fails to account for the 
interests of youth offenders.  The court’s involvement signals that this order 
cannot continue and calls upon government defendants (personified by 
politicians and head bureaucrats) to negotiate an acceptable set of reforms 
with advocates for youth offenders.
126
  If the defendants fail to cooperate, 
then they “will suffer loss of independence and increased uncertainty” when 
the court enters remedial orders.
127
 
Perhaps most ambitiously, Sabel and Simon describe how public law 




121 Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1018–19; Schlanger, supra note 89, at 556; see also 
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 147 (2003). 
122 E.g., Schlanger, supra note 89, at 569, 605 (noting a marked shift away from 
judgments and towards consent decrees, which caused the suits to fall out of case reporters; 
arguing that institutional reform lawsuits narrowed their focus to making specific 
improvements rather than trying to achieve wholesale reform). 
123 Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1018–19, 1021–22. 
124 Id. at 1053. 
125 Id. at 1055 (attributing this term to Roberto Mangabeira Unger). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1076 (citing AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT 37–39 (1996)). 
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With liberal joinder rules, stakeholders (such as public employee unions, 
which are not commonly named as parties) can participate in fashioning a 
remedy.
129
  With each stakeholder compelled to give reasons for its position 
during negotiations, the participants may find their positions altered by the 
illuminating articulation of other stakeholders’ real interests.130 
Sabel and Simon point out the “important background premise” that 
institutional reform litigation is appropriate when political processes are 
unwilling or unable to cure the government’s failure to meet minimally 
acceptable standards.
131
  Perhaps a small group with large stakes (for 
instance, staff in an institution for delinquent youths) effectively gets its 
way despite the desires of larger but diffuse groups (such as members of the 
general public who object to the mistreatment of youth offenders).
132
  Or it 
may be that a poor state of affairs can only improve through mutually 
beneficial coordination (dangerous detention centers are dangerous for staff 
no less than for youth; a shared interest in safety could be the basis of some 
improvements) but parties perceive that coordination is impossible.
133
  
Sabel and Simon believe that court intervention can make reform more 
likely in both these situations.
134
 
Other defenders of institutional reform litigation argue that “litigation 
causes change,” although there are limits to what lawsuits themselves can 
achieve directly.
135
  True reform depends on the existence of “committed 
state legislators and detention center administrators.”136  In some cases, 
judicial intervention and accompanying media attention created political 
momentum for prison reform; yet in others, the adversarial process turns 
even sympathetic administrators hostile to court intervention.
137
 
At a theoretical level, these defenses of institutional reform litigation 
are open to criticism.  First, they argue that suits can be successful, even if 
 
129 Id. at 1067–68.  But cf. Patrice Gaines-Carter & Elsa Walsh, 7 Juveniles Escape From 
Cedar Knoll, WASH. POST, July 19, 1986, at B1 (recounting an episode in which a group of 
forty-six staff members sought to express its concerns to the Jerry M. court; one member of 
the group charged that the decree “gives total control of the institution to the kids”). 
130 Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1076–77. 
131 Id. at 1062, 1064. 
132 Id. at 1064–65 (stating that Chayes emphasized this pattern). 
133 Id. at 1065. 
134 Id. at 1066. 
135 Dale, supra note 10, at 732; see also Gerhardstein, supra note 14, at 15 (asserting that 
narrow enforcement of minimum standards on conditions of confinement does nothing to 
promote “the ultimate goal of living safely in a free society upon release without re-
offending”). 
136 Dale, supra note 10, at 733. 
137 Sturm, supra note 95, at 684. 
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they do not directly resolve the problem, so long as they persuade 
politicians in the executive or legislature to treat seriously the deficiencies 
and the need for reform.  In other words, it is assumed that executives and 
legislatures are the problem: once courts supply the right political 
commitment, reform of complex systems will follow.  This view does not 
account for the possibility of agency costs; the government will simply be 
what politicians want it to be, because agency heads will give the right 
commands and agency staff will execute them.
138
  At best, this 
understanding of executive power is incomplete; proceeding along this line 
will most likely lead to a considerable amount of frustration.
139
 
Finally, a court’s intervention via institutional reform litigation also 
raises the question of its political responsibility.
140
  One is accustomed to 
hearing of a governor or an agency director called to account for the 
intolerable conditions existing in an institution.  If he fails to improve the 
situation, the governor is liable to lose control of the agency or pay fines 
ordered by the court.  The governor bears political responsibility, and he 
cannot defend himself by saying that he has not personally abused any child 
in the institution.  Yet the court rarely grasps that, from the moment it 
intervenes with orders to the executive branch, it too becomes politically 
responsible for the system and its future performance.
141
  Thus, the court 
shares in the failure whenever its remedial decree does not bring about the 
change desired. 
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE CAN BE VERY DIFFERENT 
In one sense, an institutional reform lawsuit is successful when it 
results in a court order or consent decree that mandates reforms.  But it has 
long been recognized that institutional implementation of the reforms is 




138 See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 66, at 188–90, 222–23 (recognizing the 
fundamental difference between ruling and doing, the two kinds of action in a hierarchy). 
139 See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 10 
(3d ed. 1990) (quoting the incumbent Harry Truman, who imagined how then-candidate 
Dwight Eisenhower would fare as president: “[H]e’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing 
will happen.  Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army.  He’ll find it very frustrating.”). 
140 See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 149–53 (2005) 
(contrasting individualized moral or legal responsibility with political responsibility, in 
which a member of a society is vicariously responsible for all acts done in his name). 
141 Cf. Chayes, supra note 96, at 1292 (“[B]y issuing the injunction, the court takes 
public responsibility for any consequences of its decree that may adversely affect strangers 
to the action.”). 
142 See, e.g., id. at 1302 (“The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the 
affair: its administration requires the continuing participation of the court.”). 
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This Part examines the interactions between the Jerry M. lawsuit, the 
broader goals of juvenile corrections reform, and the behavior of the actors 
who play a role in implementation.  One might expect that institutional 
interests—interests assigned by a person’s position in the bureaucratic 
landscape rather than by any personal values—would determine how each 
actor behaves.  For example, a chief executive would always oppose court 
intervention that diminishes his power over an executive branch agency.
143
  
While institutional interests certainly exist and inform behavior, they do not 
determine behavior.  Thus, one chief executive might welcome the court’s 
intervention while a successor might bitterly resist it—and in some cases 
the same executive might reverse his position to do both.
144
  The 
examination proceeds one group at a time, but the reader should bear in 
mind that these groups consist of individual members who might act 
atypically. 
It should also be said that the groups profiled here are not the only 
ones worthy of consideration.  Middle management is extremely important 
to the effectiveness of large organizations.
145
  Likewise, the youth offenders 
themselves play a central role in a juvenile corrections agency.
146
  However, 
neither group figures prominently into this Comment’s point about judicial 
intervention, and therefore neither is considered here.  For the sake of 
simplicity, this Comment generally avoids the educational component of 
the District’s reforms, which tended to observe the same arc as the 




143 Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1055 (supposing that government officials comply 
with institutional reform orders rather than risk losing control to enhanced judicial 
intervention). 
144 One observer characterized the principles of Marion S. Barry Jr., the District’s mayor 
in 1979–1990 and 1995–1998, as “situationist.”  David Remnick, The Situationist, NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 84.  On the prevalence of these views among politicians, consider 
an oft-repeated maxim of Everett Dirksen (for whom the U.S. Senate has named one of its 
three office buildings): “I am a man of fixed and unbending principles, the first of which is 
to be flexible at all times.”  E.g., Alan Ehrenhalt, Defying Proverbial Wisdom, GOVERNING, 
Dec. 2006, at 11. 
145 See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 21–22 (mentioning the importance of committed 
middle managers to the District’s implementation of reforms). 
146 See Soler et al., supra note 83, at 526–29 (illustrating the District’s “Positive Youth 
Development” philosophy of rehabilitation). 
147 Compare Julie Wakefield, Juvenile Delinquencies, WASH. CITY PAPER (May 16, 
1997), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/12695/juvenile-delinquencies 
(describing the District’s disastrous attempt to place the Oak Hill school in the hands of a 
private educational contractor), with DALY ET AL. supra note 47, at 11, 15–18 (describing the 
successful replacement of Oak Hill’s public school with a high-performing charter school in 
the mid-2000s). 
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The purpose of this examination is not to assign blame or second-
guess old decisions, but to illustrate the kinds of barriers that future 
reformers may encounter and must overcome.
148
  The District’s experience 
shows that a highly detailed consent decree will not foster compliance, 
except perhaps in an unusual case where the institution’s leading deficiency 
is that it adopted the wrong standards.  More generally, this Part argues that 
consent decrees and the efforts of courts and parties are most effective when 
they are grounded in a realistic appraisal of the institution’s central 
deficiencies. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to restate the main goals of the District’s 
reformers.
149
  Since the inception of Jerry M., plaintiffs sought to reduce the 
number of youths held inappropriately in secure confinement by developing 
community-based alternatives to incarceration, especially for youths 
awaiting trial.
150
  Additionally, plaintiffs sought to improve the quality of 
rehabilitative programming inside secure facilities and to ameliorate 
dangerous conditions related to the physical plant.
151
  Even relatively 
straightforward deficiencies resisted remediation over time.
152
  As we will 
see, the District’s implementation of reforms became a matter of great 




148 See Sturm, supra note 95, at 647 (“If litigation has not been successful in the past, one 
must ask whether there is reason to devote substantial resources to it in the future.  It is also 
important to understand why and under what circumstances litigation has prompted 
improvements in correctional institutions.”). 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 23–46 (summarizing the provisions of the Jerry 
M. Consent Decree). 
150 A classic example of inappropriate confinement involves the so-called PINS (persons 
in need of supervision), who are in reality mere status offenders—truants, runaways, and 
curfew violators.  When these offenders are placed in secure facilities, they interact in 
counterproductive ways with more serious and violent offenders.  White et al., supra note 
50, at 414–15.  The interaction is negative, as is the separation from routines of schooling 
and family life that, in most cases, present far more appropriate means of keeping the youths 
on a path towards productive adulthood. 
151 Id. 
152 As Donna Wulkan, plaintiffs’ co-counsel, said: “It seems that these issues have a life 
of their own.  We have been in court on TROs [regarding] temperature control, and we are 
back in court again, years later, essentially on a motion for contempt on temperature 
controls.”  Id. 
153 See, e.g., Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, A Farce Known as Youth Rehabilitation, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 15, 2007, at A21 (disbelieving “the rosy scenario painted by DYRS director 
Vincent Schiraldi and his devotees” in light of separate anecdotes about a “riotous situation” 
inside a secure facility and a youth who ran away from a community-based group home, then 
was seen later at a city council hearing); Robert E. Pierre, Violent Youths in D.C. Being 
Jailed Longer, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at B1 (recounting a city council hearing at which 
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A. SENIOR STAFF AND AGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The effectiveness of management can determine an organization’s 
success or failure.
154
  This statement retains its truth even where a court 
intervenes in a government agency’s operations.155  This Section contrasts a 
protracted period during which management of the District’s juvenile 
corrections agency was in disarray with a later period of greater clarity of 
purpose.  With capable management, the District achieved far more 
progress towards reforming its juvenile correctional facilities and 
complying with the Jerry M. consent decree.  In summary, this Part argues 
that without capable and cooperative management, litigation is unlikely to 
cause the desired reforms. 
1. A Series of Ineffective Leaders 
For much of the Jerry M. era, an extremely high turnover rate 
diminished the effectiveness of agency management: in the eighteen years 
between 1986 and 2004, the District’s Youth Services Administration had a 
series of nineteen top administrators.
156
  Naturally, they varied significantly 
in their approaches to juvenile corrections and their management abilities.  
Some early administrators received credit (at least from executive branch 
colleagues) for caring about kids
157
 or identifying major management 
 
“[n]ational and local experts chided critics who have suggested in recent columns by 
Washington Post columnist Colbert I. King that Schiraldi is ‘soft’ on criminals”). 
154 See, e.g., CHARLES O’REILLY, CASE HR-11, NEW UNITED MOTORS MANUFACTURING, 
INC. (NUMMI) 4–6 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/cases/
documents/HR11.pdf (describing a famous General Motors manufacturing plant in Fremont, 
California).  Shirking responsibility, substance abuse, and sabotage characterized the 
Fremont plant’s workforce; the plant was GM’s least productive and arguably lowest quality.  
Id. at 4.  After a joint venture introduced Toyota manufacturing principles, which 
emphasized trust between management and workers, the plant transformed into one of GM’s 
best—while retaining much of “a work force that GM had written off.”  Id. at 6. 
155 See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial 
Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, 
in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 12, 21–28 
(summarizing various criticisms of the effect of judicial intervention on prison management). 
156 See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 21 (“YSA directors frequently tried to introduce 
changes at Oak Hill, but because top leadership changed frequently, facility staff viewed the 
reforms as nothing more than short-term initiatives that they could wait out.”). 
157 E.g., Margaret Engel, Head of D.C. Youth Services Fired as Probes Continue, WASH. 
POST, May 31, 1986, at A7 (quoting a government spokesperson describing Patricia Quann, 
the first administrator of the Jerry M. era, as “someone who cared very much about the job 
and the children she was trying to help,” but saying that Quann faced “a very difficult 
situation” as a manager). 
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problems.
158
  Later administrators adopted an attitude that the court 
regarded as “ideologically hostile” to the decree’s goals.159  Whatever their 
intentions, none made much improvement.
160
  In 2004, the District’s 
inspector general concluded that the agency’s “leadership void has a very 
negative impact on discipline, dedication, morale, and loyalty.  Too many 
employees are not performing their day-to-day tasks satisfactorily, which, 
in turn, results in operational breakdowns across the board in security, 
oversight, monitoring of youths, . . . [and] other areas.”161 
In the lifetime of an institutional reform lawsuit, the most important 
senior managers may be those who negotiate the consent decree.
162
  This 
first generation of managers establishes the terms that endure until the 
government performs
163—often long after that generation has departed.164  
 
158 E.g., Victoria Churchville & Barton Gellman, D.C. Youth Services Chief Reportedly 
Told to Resign, WASH. POST, June 6, 1989, at D1 (stating that Jesse E. Williams authored a 
critical assessment of the agency in 1983, years before he came to the agency, and noting  
sources’ views that, as administrator, Williams “pressed with little success for the budget 
increases he thinks necessary to meet court-ordered standards”).  Of course, identifying 
problems and solving them are distinct activities. 
159 Lewis, supra note 54, at D5 (reporting that Judge Ricardo M. Urbina once welcomed 
new agency management by commenting that the city seemed “no longer ideologically 
hostile” to the consent decree). 
160 See, e.g., Joseph Tulman et al., Symposium, Reactions and Solutions, 3 D.C. L. REV. 
425, 430–36 (1995) (reprinting remarks by acting YSA administrator Joyce Burrell, who 
described her job as a “balancing act of deciding whether to rush [youth offenders] out [of 
secure confinement] . . . or pay the fines” assessed for overcrowding). 
161 ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 22. 
162 The Supreme Court recently frowned on federally entered consent decrees that “bind 
state and local officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors and may thereby 
‘improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.’”  
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 449 (2009) (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 
(2004)).  The District attempted to seize on Horne’s reasoning as grounds for terminating all 
structural reform decrees against it in federal court; the district courts supervising those 
consent decrees have uniformly found the argument unimpressive.  See Salazar v. District of 
Columbia, 729 F. Supp. 2d 257, 262 (D.D.C. 2010); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 
147–49 (D.D.C. 2010); LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 115 (D.D.C. 
2010); see also DeBonis, supra note 72 (spotlighting the sharp dispute between attorney 
general Peter Nickles and the plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges involved, and showing that the 
lawsuits have support among the District’s legislators).  But the D.C. Circuit has reversed 
one refusal to terminate, concluding that “[t]he district court’s Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry fell 
short of what is required by Horne v. Flores.”  Petties ex rel. Martin v. District of Columbia, 
662 F.3d 564, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
163 See Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 117. 
164 See Bradley S. Chilton & Susette M. Talarico, Politics and Constitutional 
Interpretation in Prison Reform Litigation: The Case of Guthrie v. Evans, in COURTS, 
CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 115, 124–25 (describing the 
“generational effect” existing where one generation of institutional reform litigants designs a 
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In the District, the senior managers who agreed to the consent decree’s 
provisions appear not to have considered agency costs or any other 
difficulties of implementation.
165
  Such blindness to the near future suggests 
that the District’s managers166 wrongly believed that, by accepting the 
consent decree, they could make the litigation go away.
167
  Alternatively, 
the first-generation managers may rationally have recognized their ability to 
personally depart for other jobs, leaving future generations to bear the costs 
of implementing a poorly designed agreement.
168
 
Even if the first-generation managers intend to live with the lawsuit, 
there remains the question of whether they will subvert their own narrow 
interests to the broader goals of the institutional reform lawsuit.
169
  The 
annals of adult prison litigation include cautionary tales in which skillful 
administrators exploit lawsuits not to reform but to entrench their 
philosophies of corrections.
170
  This type of response shows that, in 
 
remedy but their successors implement it, sometimes without remembering the purpose of 
the decree’s provisions); see also Cripe, supra note 110, at 275 (referring to prison litigation 
and lamenting that “[t]he sad fact is that the directors or commissioners who approved the 
settlement often depart soon after, in the perpetual musical chairs operation which besets 
most correction systems in this country”). 
165 Responsibility for negotiating the decree appears to have belonged not to the head of 
the Youth Services Administration, but to the parent agency’s head, the Commissioner of 
Social Services.  Compare Margaret Engel & Benjamin Weiser, Settlement Seen Near on 
Juvenile Facilities, WASH. POST, July 2, 1986, at B1 (reporting a statement of Commissioner 
Audrey Rowe on proposed settlement terms designed to protect youths from staff abuse: 
“Management doesn’t condone that, so that isn’t a problem in [negotiating] the settlement”), 
with Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 11 (“The defendants and their successors in 
office and agents, employees or others who are providing services to or on behalf of YSA, 
related to juveniles placed in YSA custody, shall comply with the terms of this Decree.”). 
166 On the motivations of the mayor who agreed to the settlement, see infra text 
accompanying notes 347–52. 
167 See Margaret Engel, Report Cites D.C. Youth Agency ‘Chaos,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 
1986, at B1 (reporting the court monitor’s assessment that, six months after the consent 
decree was signed, the system “remains in chaos,” but noting that the city “expended 
substantial effort and made improvements in some areas” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
168 Compare Engel & Weiser, supra note 165, with USDA Biographies: Audrey Rowe, 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&
contentid=bios_rowe.xml (retrieved Feb. 4, 2011) (touting “a career of non-stop successes”) 
(since the initial drafting of this article, the quoted material has been removed from the 
webpage; a PDF of the earlier version is on file with the author). 
169 See Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 117 (stating that “agency officials . . . 
often seek to use the lawsuit as a way to implement their own favorite ideas and to free 
themselves from policy constraints and budget restrictions imposed by other officials”). 
170 See Schlanger, supra note 89, at 562–63 (quoting one prison administrator who 
explained: “we used ‘court orders’ and ‘consent decrees’ for leverage.  We ranted and raved 
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practice, one cannot count on institutional reform lawsuits to destabilize an 




There is no doubting that the parade of ineffective managers and 





 alike.  This frustration led to harsh sanctions, such as contempt 
findings and the imposition of fines for ongoing noncompliance.
174
  The 
initial fines prompted the District to fire an administrator—but instead of 
seeking a manager to achieve compliance, the mayor’s top advisors began 
expressing second thoughts about the consent decree.
175
  Instead of 
persuading the defiant defendant, the court’s attempt at coercion contributed 
to the adversarial hostility that marked Jerry M.’s implementation phase.176 
2. Organizational Changes 
Some evidence suggests that the organizational structure of the 
District’s agencies—primarily, the fact that the juvenile corrections agency 
was, for a long time, a bureau buried within a much larger department—
contributed to the slow pace of change.
177
  However, the experience of other 
states suggests that no one organizational structure is inherently more 
 
for decades about getting federal judges ‘out of our business’; but we secretly smiled as we 
requested greater and greater budgets to build facilities, hire staff, and upgrade equipment”). 
171 See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1055–56, 1065–67.  Recognizing that 
institutional reform lawsuits often make available resources that the agency might not 
otherwise obtain, Sabel and Simon suppose that these resources induce agencies to 
participate in the crafting of a remedy.  Id. at 1065–66. 
172 See, e.g., Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 
15, 2004) (Order VIII) at 21 (finding “a continuing pattern evident in previous enforcement 
hearings, a lack of coherent planning at the highest levels, faulty implementation, and a 
tendency to thrust hastily devised compliance policies upon mid-level and line staff”). 
173 Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney’s 
assessment that “the defendants have a history and a pattern of changing the guard 
periodically and that becomes an excuse to stall and delay”). 
174 District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 190–92 (D.C. 1990) (upholding the 
trial judge’s finding of contempt); Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (reporting 
the imposition of fines of $100 per day per youth held in secure confinement in excess of 
court-ordered population limits). 
175 See Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (suggesting that the imposition of 
fines was a proximate cause of an administrator’s firing, and attributing reservations to the 
city administrator and corporation counsel). 
176 Cf. Sturm, supra note 95, at 684 (noting that the executive’s initial receptiveness to an 
institutional reform lawsuit can give way to hostility). 
177 See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 3. 
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conducive to reform.
178
  Nonetheless, a major organizational shakeup can 
invigorate a lethargic public agency.
179
 
At the outset of Jerry M., the District’s youth corrections agency was 
known as the Youth Services Administration (YSA).
180
  The administrator 
of YSA reported to the commissioner of social services, who reported to a 
director of the Department of Human Services (DHS), who reported to the 
mayor.
181
  Thus, the YSA administrator had to fight for resources and 
management autonomy against a host of higher-ups, who might second-
guess the administrator or have other priorities for the department.
182
 
Meanwhile, DHS suffered from its own chronic bouts of 
mismanagement.
183
  The District’s inability to improve conditions in secure 
facilities stemmed in part from “insufficient oversight by senior 
management at DHS who may be too far removed from YSA’s day-to-day 
operations and the youths being served.”184  Accordingly, the District’s 
inspector general recommended that the mayor consider removing YSA 
from DHS and making it a separate department with a director directly 




178 Compare MILLER, supra note 6, at 32 (stating that Massachusetts created its 
Department of Youth Services after a series of youth abuse scandals rocked its Youth 
Service Board; Jerome Miller, the department’s first head, embarked on the nation’s first 
juvenile justice deinstitutionalization effort), with MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, 
at 14 (noting that Missouri’s Division of Youth Services, the model youth corrections 
agency, is part of the state’s larger Department of Social Services).  See also John Kelly, 
Stand-Alone Juvenile Justice Agencies Dwindling in Number, YOUTH TODAY (Jan. 22, 2011), 
http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4584 (stating that sixteen states 
currently have separate juvenile justice agencies and noting a recent trend towards merging 
them with child welfare agencies or social services departments). 
179 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (B.F. Wright ed., 1961) 
(“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government . . . .  
[A]nd a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad 
government.”). 
180 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979, D.C. CODE div. I, tit. 1, ch. 15, subch. III, pt. A, 
§ IV(C)(4) (LexisNexis 2001). 
181 See, e.g., id. (showing YSA’s place in the bureaucracy); Jerry M. Consent Decree, 
supra note 2, at 40–41 (stating that each of these officials is a Jerry M. defendant, in his 
official capacity). 
182 See Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (stating that the director of human 
services sided with the commissioner of social services, who refused to support the YSA 
administrator’s budget requests). 
183 See, e.g., Michael Powell, Wasting Time, Space and Money: Business as Usual at 
Human Services, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at A22. 
184 ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 22. 
185 Id. at 24. 
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Though DHS disagreed with the recommendation, the city council 
responded to mounting pressure from the courts and the public by adopting 
it legislatively.
186
  The council hoped the altered management structure 
would enable the cabinet-level agency to comply with the terms of the Jerry 
M. decree.
187
  But the restyled organization remained unlikely to change 
much, so long as it lacked effective management.
188
 
3. Proactive Management, Compliance, and Far-Reaching Reform 
The new agency, renamed the Department of Youth Rehabilitation 
Services (DYRS), found a highly capable leader in Vincent N. Schiraldi, a 
longtime reform advocate who had studied the District and brought with 
him a reform-oriented senior management team.
189
  Schiraldi took the job 
hoping “to improve decency and outcomes for a population of young people 
who are nearly 100% youth of color.”190  Instead, because the department’s 
operations were so profoundly broken, he quickly found his energy 
consumed with basic operational questions such as determining who would 
fix broken boilers that robbed secure facilities of heat and how to purchase 
adequate supplies of underwear.
191
 
Of course, Schiraldi had more ambitious plans, such as reducing the 
overuse of secure confinement and implementing evidence-based 
rehabilitation programs.
192
  By developing community-based alternatives to 
secure confinement, DYRS reduced the average number of youths in locked 
 
186 Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services Establishment Act of 2004, 52 D.C. 
Reg. 2025, D.C. Law 15-335 (Apr. 12, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 2-1515.01–2-
1515.10 (LexisNexis 2001)); ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 24 (reprinting the DHS response 
to the recommendation) (“The current leadership at DHS is capable of providing 
management oversight necessary for YSA.”). 
187 See D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON BILL 15-1000, at 2, 9 
(2004). 
188 See ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 24 (“[G]iven a reasonable period of time, a highly 
experienced manager with a background in juvenile justice who is accountable directly to the 
Executive Office of the Mayor, can bring stability and focus to YSA operations, and put the 
agency on the path to meeting all requirements of the Jerry M. Decree.”). 
189 DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 5, 21 (mentioning that Schiraldi hired the new 
agency’s deputy director, chief of staff, chief of committed services, and Oak Hill 
superintendent).  Schiraldi was not the District’s first choice for the position; for a discussion 
of his appointment, see infra text accompanying note 359. 
190 Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 2. 
191 Id. 
192 See Soler et al., supra note 83, at 525–26. Coauthor Marc Schindler was a key 
member of Schiraldi’s management team and succeeded him as director of the agency.  See 
infra Part IV.G.  For a description of DYRS’s reform agenda, including its rehabilitative 
model and measurements of the agency’s success, see Soler et al., supra note 83, at 525–29. 
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custody by nearly 40%, from 255 in 2005 to 154 in 2009.
193
  It is more 
difficult to quantify how DYRS changed its culture to become more 
rehabilitative, but the contrast from the culture of a traditional youth prison 
is stark.
194
  For example, DYRS abandoned the use of solitary confinement, 




Most concretely, the District constructed New Beginnings, a radically 
different, sixty-bed secure facility that replaced the long-troubled Oak Hill 
Youth Center.
196
  Describing the facilities at New Beginnings, Schiraldi 
said: 
It has beautiful windows and light, wood rafters, wooden doors, windows in the kids’ 
rooms that they can open themselves.  It has almost three times as much programming 
space as is required by national standards (including a 125 seat auditorium where the 
kids regularly perform music and plays and have awards ceremonies), a terrific 
gymnasium, a school with smart boards in every room, and a great shop class.  These 
words don’t come out of my mouth easily, but this is the nicest, most decent physical 
plant of any correctional facility I’ve ever been in.
197
 
In response to pressure from the court and the council, the District had 
budgeted over $34 million for the new facility shortly after Schiraldi’s 
arrival.
198
  Yet without the right leadership, even this massive appropriation 
 
193 See id. at 527. 
194 See Wildeboer, supra note 71 (describing facilities and programming at New 
Beginnings, and contrasting them to those of its predecessor, Oak Hill, and Illinois detention 
centers). 
195 Robert Wildeboer, Inside and Out: The Impact of Solitary Confinement in a Youth 
Prison (WBEZ 91.5 FM broadcast May 12, 2010), available at http://www.wbez.org/
episode-segments/inside-and-out-impact-solitary-confinement-youth-prison# (audio 
recording), http://insideandout.chicagopublicradio.org/content/impact-solitary-confinement-
youth-prison (written transcript) (quoting Schindler saying, “[y]ou can try and beat ‘em 
down, which is what a lot of correctional approaches do, and try to punish them into good 
behavior, but all the experience and the research shows . . . it just doesn’t work”); see also 
MILLER, supra note 6, at 65, 99–100 (describing the “Tombs” in Massachusetts’s harshest 
extended isolation facility, to which youths from other facilities could be transferred as a 
punishment for bad behavior). 
196 See Robert E. Pierre, Oak Hill Center Emptied and Its Baggage Left Behind, WASH. 
POST, May 29, 2009, at B1 (quoting Schiraldi: “This is the anti-prison”). 
197 Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 4; see also Hamil R. Harris, Blog, ‘New 
Beginnings’ for Youthful Offenders, WASH. POST (May 29, 2009, 4:40 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2009/05/new_beginnings_for_youthful_of.html 
(posting a video of the facility). 
198 See COUNCIL OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON THE 
FY 2006 BUDGET REQUEST 15–16 & n.6 (May 9, 2005) (noting that replacement of Oak Hill 
had been urged by the Jerry M. plaintiffs, the 2001 report of the Mayor’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform, and Title XI of the Omnibus 
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likely would not have resulted in reform.  When Schiraldi arrived at DYRS, 
the agency planned to replace Oak Hill with a prison four times larger than 
New Beginnings,
199
 which “by virtue of its sheer size would have 
encouraged an over-reliance on the use of secure incarceration . . . and 
effectively prevented the city from making substantial investments towards 
developing effective community-based programs, supports and services.”200  
The small size of New Beginnings reflects a deliberate choice, informed by 
research about the population of the District’s youth offenders,201 to resist 
overconfinement by constraining the availability of confinement space.
202
 
While it may be simple to suppose that building bigger facilities will 
alleviate overcrowding and its attendant problems, facility expansion 
presents a significant danger of replicating preexisting problems on a larger 
scale.
203
  A federal court once ordered the District to construct an additional 
300-bed facility to alleviate overcrowding at the Lorton Youth Center, 
where the District confined those offenders aged eighteen to twenty-two 
who were deemed promising candidates for rehabilitation.
204
  This order 
 
Juvenile Justice Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 1188, D.C. Law 15-261 (effective Mar. 17, 2005) 
(codified at D.C. CODE § 24-941 (LexisNexis 2001))). 
199 See generally DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS. (D.C.), YOUTH SERVS. ADMIN., LITTLE RIVER 
YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with the author) (stating program 
requirements and proposing a site plan for a 240-bed secure facility, to be called “Little 
River”). 
200 Testimony of Vincent N. Schiraldi Before the D.C. Council Committee on Human 
Services, Feb. 16, 2006, at 2 [hereinafter Schiraldi Testimony]. 
201 DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS. (D.C.), OAK HILL REPLACEMENT CAPACITY NEEDS 
ANALYSIS (Feb. 20, 2006) (on file with the author) (citing an analysis conducted by the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation concluding that a sixty-bed facility would be appropriate to 
house the District’s most serious youth offenders, who would stay longer in secure custody 
to protect public safety and provide adequate time for therapeutic rehabilitation); cf. Jerry M. 
v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1987) (Memorandum 
Order A) at 19 (ordering the District to reduce the number of committed youths held in 
secure confinement to sixty, in accordance with the Jerry M. panel’s recommendation). 
202 Schiraldi Testimony, supra note 200, at 8 (mentioning plans to design a sixty-bed 
facility to replace Oak Hill); see also Bart Lubow & Joseph B. Tulman, Introduction, The 
Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of Columbia, 3 D.C. L. REV. ix, xii (1995) 
(“[I]f a community builds detention beds, the decision makers will fill those beds with 
children.  If a community refuses to maintain detention beds, community resources and 
programs will work with children and produce better results.”). 
203 See Schiraldi Testimony, supra note 200, at 2 (cautioning against an “edifice 
complex” which supposes that all the problems of juvenile justice can be solved with newer, 
larger facilities). 
204 See U.S. v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 981–82 (D.D.C. 1971) (Gesell, J.) 
(supplemental memorandum) (predating self-government in the District) (describing 
elements of a plan developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the mayor–commissioner 
to create facilities for youth offenders, separated from the District’s adult prison in Lorton, 
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sought to bring the facilities up to the standards imposed by “[t]he 
Constitution, the [federal] Youth Corrections Act, and the conscience of a 
civilized society.”205  But construction of a new Lorton Youth Center II did 




Though Schiraldi’s leadership proved extraordinary in many ways, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that reform depended on Schiraldi’s 
personal involvement.  Schiraldi’s efforts to change the culture of the secure 
facilities relied on extensive staff training and technical assistance from the 
Missouri Youth Services Institute, a consulting firm founded by Mark 
Steward to help other jurisdictions adopt the “Missouri model” of youth 
corrections.
207
  During Schiraldi’s tenure, the District also began 
participating in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, an extensive 
national effort of the Annie E. Casey Foundation that engages local judges, 
prosecutors, defenders, juvenile corrections and probation agencies, and 
other stakeholders to reduce the inappropriate incarceration of youths 
awaiting trial.
208
  Though YSA sought the help of consultants before 
Schiraldi’s arrival, the rudderless agency wasted the consultants’ advice.209  
 
Virginia); see also HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT, ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: HON. 
GERHARD A. GESELL app.3 (1998), available at http://www.dcchs.org/GerhardAGesell/
gerhardagesell_complete.pdf (recounting Judge Gesell’s memory of ordering reluctant city 
leaders to build a new facility). 
205 Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. at 983. 
206 See Ogletree, supra note 111, at 704–06 (citing United States v. Tillman, 374 F. Supp. 
215 (D.D.C. 1974) and United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1974)) (stating 
that federal judges ordered later enhancements in the quality of diagnostic procedures 
employed for entering youths). 
207 Soler et al., supra note 83, at 525–27 (describing the District’s changes); Christine 
Vestal, States Adopt Missouri Youth Justice Model, STATELINE (Mar. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=288904 (profiling MYSI). 
208 RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., TWO DECADES OF JDAI: FROM 
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO NATIONAL STANDARD 2, 8 (2009) [hereinafter TWO DECADES 
OF JDAI], available at www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention
%20Alternatives%20Initiative/TwoDecadesofJDAIFromDemonstrationProjecttoNat/JDAI_
National_final_10_07_09.pdf.  For a comprehensive list of technical assistance and capacity-
building services that philanthropies provided to DYRS, see LIZ RYAN & MARC SCHINDLER, 
NOTORIOUS TO NOTABLE: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY IN 
TRANSFORMING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 25–29 (2011), 
available at http://www.publicwelfare.org/Newsroom/Overview/11-12-01/Reforming_
Juvenile_Justice_in_DC.aspx. 
209 See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 27–30 (listing the specific findings of a section 
entitled, “YSA’s use of consultants has been largely ineffective and characterized by 
unauthorized overspending, incomplete deliverables, unfulfilled objectives, and poor agency 
oversight”). 
934 WILL SINGER [Vol. 102 
Finally, despite Schiraldi’s success in transforming the agency, some 
observers have suggested the agency would benefit over the long term from 
a director with a management style that made line staff feel more valued.
210
 
In other words, reform becomes a realistic prospect when 
administrators possess the desire and ability to implement a research-based 
and cost-effective approach to youth corrections.
211
  Most importantly for 
present purposes, a juvenile corrections agency with capable and committed 
administrators can accomplish and sustain progress far more effectively 
than a lawsuit can.
212
 
B. LINE STAFF 
A youth rehabilitation agency’s most important employees are its 
front-line staff, who have great potential to influence youths—positively or 
negatively—through their constant interactions.213  In the District, some 
staff adopted Schiraldi’s philosophy of reform and served as a valuable 
source of suggestions for improvement.
214
  However, the illustrations below 
show that uncooperative staff members can undermine the implementation 
of reforms in ways that mock both the control of agency management and 
the efficacy of judicial intervention.  Understanding and overcoming staff 
 
210 See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 27; Nikita Stewart, Juvenile Justice Chief in D.C. 
is Leaving Post, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2009, at B4 (quoting D.C. Councilmember Tommy 
Wells).  Schiraldi’s blunt manner of speaking could upset the agency’s staff.  E.g., Sue Anne 
Pressley, The Evolution of Oak Hill, WASH. POST, April 9, 2006, at A1 (repeating Schiraldi’s 
widely circulated remark that “I would not want to kennel my dog at Oak Hill,” which staff 
understood as an insult). 
211 See MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 5.  “A new wave of reform is 
gathering force, dual-powered by a growing recognition that the conventional practices 
aren’t getting the job done, and by the accumulating evidence that far better results are 
available through a fundamentally different approach.”  Id. 
212 Dale, supra note 10, at 733. 
213 See MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 28 (stating that Missouri’s model of 
secure facilities depends on “intensive supervision by highly motivated, highly trained staff 
constantly interacting with youth to create an environment of trust and respect”); see also 
Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to 
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 161 (2012) (“[W]ithin 
criminal justice systems most front-line staff are themselves significant power-holders.  
Hence, the full study of power-holder legitimacy in the field of criminal justice necessarily 
requires attention to be paid, not only to senior but also to junior power-holders and to the 
interaction between them.”). 
214 DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 18 (stating that school staff at the District’s New 
Beginnings facility helped implement the agency’s new rehabilitative model through their 
constructive interactions with youths and by showing unit staff, who were generally more 
skeptical, that the model could succeed).  For a report on DYRS staff attitudes to specific 
reforms, as expressed in focus groups and interviews, see id. at 5–8, 17–26. 
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resistance is critical to the success of a reform effort, whether it began on 
the initiative of agency management or the court.
215
  Most particularly, this 
Section shows why litigants and the court should not presume that detailed 
court orders will receive automatic obedience, even if government leaders 
use their utmost diligence. 
In making changes at DYRS, Schiraldi and his management team “ran 
into staff resistance at almost every step.”216  The predominantly 
“correctional-minded” staff resisted a new rehabilitative model designed to 
build on the strengths of youths and their families.
217
  Still, many of the 
staff who opposed Schiraldi’s reforms resolved not to change and not to 
leave, but to outlast his tenure—a reasonable option considering the churn 
of leaders during the time of the Jerry M. consent decree.
218
 
Before Schiraldi arrived and even before Jerry M. began, staff resisted 
court-imposed reforms affecting the institutional culture.  For example, 
when a pre-Jerry M. court issued a disciplinary code to standardize 
punishment for confined youths who displayed disobedience, staff routinely 
disregarded the code and continued to punish youths as they pleased.
219
  
Even when staff complied with the rules, they could do so in ways that 
undermined the rules’ purpose of standardizing discipline.220  Because the 
court cannot be present to enforce its order, telling line staff what to do lies 
 
215 Id. at 27 (“The literature on best practices in implementing juvenile and criminal 
justice programs shows that gaining acceptance from staff is extremely important, 
particularly for reforms that involve a transformation of agency philosophy and institutional 
culture.”). 
216 Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 3. 
217 Soler et al., supra note 83, at 526, 529. 
218 See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 1. 
219 Weiser, supra note 79, at A1.  For example, a 300-pound recreation counselor, who 
found a youth with a bottle of liquor at football practice, promptly “slammed his forearm 
into the boy’s chest and sent him sprawling.”  Id. at A1, A18.  He explained that the court’s 
new rules were not his priority: “I deal with the problem first, rules second.”  Id. at A1.  And 
he lamented the effect of court-imposed standards on the facility: “If we’d go back to some 
of the things that we used to do in the old days we would be a better institution.”  Id. at A18. 
220 Id.  In one case, a counselor accused six boys of plotting to escape and hiding a pair 
of scissors.  The counselor, who had pronounced the boys “dead meat,” reacted angrily when 
a panel of other staff ordered only seven days in isolation for each offense.  Told that seven 
days was the code’s maximum punishment, the counselor urged ignoring the code “because 
any appeal would come too late—the boys would have already served their sentences.”  Id.  
An on-site public defender exclaimed “You can’t do that!” so the counselor proposed that 
the boys could remain “Right here” under his direct supervision for longer.  Id.  During her 
turn to speak, the defender added, “I’ve heard that a few of the boys were visited [before the 
hearing] by various counselors, who were choking them, slapping them around, threatening 
them . . . .”  Id. (alterations in original).  The counselor began shouting at the defender, and 
the panel adjourned after ordering the boys to isolation.  Id. 
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outside the court’s zone of competency—unless the court puts itself in the 
position of management by imposing the extreme remedy of receivership.
221
 
On one view, the effort to change a juvenile correctional facility is a 
battle for control.  For a very long time, an alarming number of staff 
brought alcohol and drugs inside secure facilities and sold or gave them to 
youths.
222
  Obviously this smuggling undermined whatever treatment efforts 
were even attempted inside the facility, where “nearly 100% of . . . youths 
suffer[ed] from substance abuse problems.”223  Staff may have enhanced 
their control of a unit by distributing drugs to favored youths or keeping 
them from disfavored youths.
224
  Alternatively, staff may have sold drugs to 
youths simply to make money for themselves.
225
  Either way, it is clear that 
some staff would readily sacrifice rehabilitative progress if it could help 
them; in such circumstances management does not appear to have control. 
Staff resistance can take other forms that do not harm youths directly.  
Many staff, with apparent assistance from lower management, manipulated 
 
221 See Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, 738 A.2d 1206, 1213 (D.C. 1999) (“The 
appointment of a receiver to act in the place of ‘elected and appointed officials is an 
extraordinary step warranted only by the most compelling circumstances.’  Essentially it is 
the remedy of last resort, and therefore, should be undertaken only when absolutely 
necessary.” (quoting Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976))). 
222 Some staff dealt drugs to confined youths in 1980, in 2004, and in between.  See, e.g., 
In re An Inquiry Into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at and 
Committed at Cedar Knoll Inst., 430 A.2d 1087, 1089 (D.C. 1981) (noting that Family Court 
Judge Gladys Kessler found evidence of a drug trade between staff dealers and youth 
customers); ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 30 (“[Oak Hill] employees and substance abuse 
treatment counselors stated that Youth Correctional Officers (YCOs) are a primary source of 
the illegal substances used by youths.”); Benjamin Weiser, Delinquents, Staff Linked in 
Deals, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1985, at A1 [hereinafter Delinquents] (describing “an 
institution that has almost given up trying to combat the drug problem, . . . where a few 
counselors allegedly use and deal in drugs themselves”). 
223 ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 30–31 (stating that many youths who were drug-free 
upon entering Oak Hill later tested positive for marijuana and PCP after a period of 
confinement).  But cf. Jeffrey A. Butts, Blog, How Prevalent Are Substance Abuse and 
Mental Heatlth Issues in Juvenile Justice? The Answer May Surprise You (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://blog.reclaimingfutures.org/?q=node/1461 (citing Gail Wasserman et al., Psychiatric 
Disorder, Comorbidity, and Suicidal Behavior in Juvenile Justice Youth, 37 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 1361 (2011)) (interpreting a study of a large sample of youths involved at various 
levels with the juvenile justice system as showing that repeat offenders and youths in secure 
confinement are much more likely to have substance abuse or mental health issues than first-
time or lower-level juvenile offenders). 
224 In 1985, one youth at Oak Hill explained that a staff member supplied him with 
drugs, which the youth sold inside the institution.  Weiser, Delinquents, supra note 222, at 
A14.  The youth’s money “won him a special standing with his own counselor” because the 
youth was able to “lend[] his counselor money as a way of gaining immunity.”  Id. 
225 Id. (quoting one head counselor: “There’s a lot of profiteers [among the staff]”). 
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work schedules and timecards to supplement their regular pay with large 
helpings of overtime.
226
  Overtime abuse can become pervasive when there 
is widespread absenteeism or when lower management is allowed to grant 
overtime to favored staff.  Overspending on overtime puts chronic pressure 
on the department’s budget, consuming funds intended for other uses, 
including the development of alternatives to placing delinquent youths in 
secure detention.
227
  While overtime abuse might not harm youths as 
directly as other staff actions can, it is an important and readily quantifiable 
sign that middle management is neither susceptible to control of senior 
management nor disposed to act properly outside of close supervision.
228
 
A much more visible and damaging form of staff sabotage consisted of 
recurring staff-aided escapes.
229
  By passively declining to intervene to stop 
an escape in progress
230
 or sometimes assisting more actively, staff can 
express displeasure by disrupting the institutional order.
231
  Explaining why 
one escape occurred, an unnamed source told a reporter: “Many of the old 
staff are angry that overtime has been cut back significantly, and there is a 
feeling that they may be letting the kids go and looking the other way in an 
attempt to make the place look like it’s falling apart.”232 
Escapes are damaging because, unlike nearly every other type of 
occurrence at a secure facility, they receive extensive media attention.  This 
attention reflects poorly not on the staff, but on reformers (whether agency 
 
226 See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 101–03 (investigating the agency in the year 
before Schiraldi’s arrival).  Line staff routinely disregarded a timecard policy requiring them 
to sign in and out upon arriving at and departing from work.  Id. at 101.  Andersen’s report 
noted with understatement that “[f]ailure to adhere to this policy creates a potential for [time 
and attendance] fraud.”  Id.  Another agency policy limited each employee to 24 hours of 
overtime in a two-week pay period, but line staff were observed “consistently exceeding the 
24-hour limit by averaging 30–60 overtime hours per pay period.”  Id. at 102. 
227 See White et al., supra note 50, at 416 (expressing the frustration of Donna Wulkan, 
co-counsel to the Jerry M. plaintiffs, that the institutions relied heavily on overtime while 
lacking resources needed to hire more staff). 
228 Engel, supra note 157, at A1 (quoting Mayor Marion Barry making this point). 
229 See also MILLER, supra note 6, at 98–103 (describing administrative and political 
responses to staff-aided escapes from Massachusetts reform schools). 
230 E.g., Sari Horwitz & Elsa Walsh, Escape of 12 Teen Offenders Probed, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 19, 1987, at C6 (quoting a department director saying, “I have some questions about 
how alert the staff on the bus was at the time” that three youths escaped through a window). 
231 Cf. Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1077–80 (discussing litigation’s “stakeholder 
effects” and illustrating examples in which the emerging stakeholders act in ways that 
advance the lawsuit’s goals). 
232 Elsa Walsh, Four More Youths Flee From Oak Hill Facility, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 
1986, at B3.  But cf. id. (quoting a named staff member who discounted the theory of staff 
assistance and said the youths involved “just want to go home”). 
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managers or a court) who have destabilized the institutional order.
233
  
Actors who destabilize a system are obvious objects of opposition from 
other actors whose stability is threatened.
234
  Seen from this perspective, 
escapes are an effective means of destroying reformers’ credibility and 
undermining their political support.  In one especially embarrassing 
episode, a youth escaped from New Beginnings one day after a ribbon-
cutting ceremony at which Mayor Adrian Fenty called it “one of the best 
rehabilitative facilities in the country.”235  Determining exactly which 
employees were responsible is typically difficult and time-consuming, 
especially compared to the immediacy of negative coverage.
236
  And it may 
be impossible to determine whether a particular escape was caused by staff 
sabotage, or by overcrowding and staffing shortages—both of which are 
well beyond staff control. 
These anecdotes suggest that some line staff have a perceived interest 
in undermining changes without regard to whether management or a court 
ordered them.
237
  But it cannot be forgotten that there are also staff 
members who embrace new approaches and offer valuable ideas about 
improvement.
238
  One evaluation of the DYRS reforms found that, while 
“many staff were supportive of the new therapeutic model, and many were 
opposed to it, [interviews and focus groups] also revealed a large majority 
who fell somewhere in between the two extremes.”239  Developing 
 
233 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1062 (conceiving of public law litigation as a 
means of enforcing a right to destabilize a public institution controlled by entrenched 
interests); see also id. at 1064–65 (mentioning the influence of regulatory capture theory on 
the theory of public law litigation). 
234 See, e.g., White et al., supra note 50, at 412 (recognizing “the issue of the city 
employees whose jobs would be in jeopardy because, in a sense, the [deinstitutionalization] 
plan is establishing private nonprofit organizations,” and proposing that existing staff be 
retrained to work in community-based alternatives). 
235 Darryl Fears, Inmate Escapes New Jail for Youths, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at B1. 
236 E.g., Paul Duggan, D.C. Punishes Youth Center Employees for Escapes, WASH. POST, 
July 10, 2009, at B1 (reporting, five weeks after an escape, that the department fired five 
staff and disciplined three supervisors for their actions, which the mayor described only 
vaguely as constituting a failure to “do everything they could have and should have done to 
prevent these escapes”).  Though the employees’ union representative had no comment on 
the firings, she derided the new facility as “Camp Cupcake.”  Id. 
237 See MILLER, supra note 6, at 98 (“Staff-stimulated incidents are not meant to 
demonstrate the uncommon incorrigibility, violence, or character of the staff but of the 
inmates—inmates clearly in need of stricter regimens.”). 
238 See, e.g., Chico Harlan, Leap of Faith, WASH. POST MAG., Oct. 21, 2007, at W12 
(profiling an Oak Hill recreation counselor who requested and received permission to take 
eight committed youths on a camping and rafting trip to the Grand Canyon as a reward for 
their good behavior). 
239 DALY ET. AL, supra note 47, at 22–23. 
2012] JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM 939 
constructive relationships with line staff is essential to implementing a 
reform effort seeking to remake an institution’s culture.240  And, most 
importantly for present purposes, courts cannot assume that staff members 
do only what they are told.
241
 
In this light, one must question whether highly detailed orders make a 
constructive contribution to the creative task of building a new, 
rehabilitative juvenile corrections agency.
242
  In Jerry M., the need to 
measure compliance with the consent decree imposed administrative 
burdens that distracted from staff’s work with youths.243  More importantly, 
mandating a level of performance measured by detailed standards may be 
appropriate when the agency is holding itself to the wrong standards.  But 
when the problem is that a chaotic institution casually inflicts intolerable 
suffering on the youths it is supposed to protect, imposing higher or more 
specific standards for conduct is more likely to compound the failure than 
to spur reform.
244
  This compound failure can itself become an obstacle to 
reform; in Schiraldi’s view, “the law suit and judicial oversight served to 
contribute to an atmosphere of profound learned-helplessness, with staff 
 
240 See AMANDA B. CISSNER & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 
AVOIDING FAILURES OF IMPLEMENTATION 6 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/FailureFinal.pdf (discussing 
approaches to gaining line staff’s acceptance of correctional reforms); see also, e.g., DALY 
ET AL., supra note 47, at 27 (noting agency management’s periodic efforts to engage DYRS 
staff). 
241 See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 7 (“[T]he legal system and the courts 
believe that if something is simply ordered, it must be done, which is completely the 
opposite of my experience with large government bureaucracies.”). 
242 E.g., Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 
2004) (Order VIII) at 9 (finding the District in contempt for failure to show, inter alia, 
compliance with a consent decree provision requiring the District “to assure that the assigned 
Treatment Team takes primary responsibility for developing the [youth’s Individual Service 
Plan], assisted by diagnostic staff,” apparently because the diagnostic staff members 
assumed too much of this responsibility); see also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 113, at 15 
(proposing a framework for evaluating the relative risks and rewards of establishing public 
policy goals through “juridification”). 
243 E.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 82 (stating case managers’ view that unrealistic 
deadlines for assessments and treatment plan reviews required them to be “‘paper 
processors’ rather than clinicians,” and recommending negotiations with the plaintiffs to 
amend these requirements); cf. Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Prison Litigation and 
Bureaucratic Development, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 125, 145 (1992) (arguing that a strong 
bureaucracy protects inmate rights). 
244 See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 3–4 (“Staff themselves had become 
institutionalized and numb to the impact of the daily indignities foisted upon the young 
people by day-to-day exposure to such inhumane conditions.”). 
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fully believing that there was nothing that could be done to pull the 
department out of its downward spiral.”245 
Though line staff may not be high enough on the organizational chart 
to be named defendants,
246
 a court can take constructive actions aimed at 
promoting reform through improvements in the line staff.  A court might 
order the agency to adopt higher training or educational requirements on the 
workforce
247
 or, somewhat more drastically, suspend civil service job 
security protections to the extent they interfere with the constitutional rights 
of incarcerated youths.  Even changes to seemingly unrelated processes 
(such as the authorization of overtime hours) can have the effect of 
disrupting the status quo so that a new workplace culture can take hold.  On 
the other hand, a court may justifiably believe that these kinds of changes 




In other institutional reform litigation contexts, there may be some 
reason to consider “the court”—meaning the individual judge presiding 
over the class action—as the only relevant personification of judicial 
power.
249
  But Jerry M. presents a very different context, in which a family 
division judge manages a consent decree governing correctional facilities 
while other family division judges continuously order delinquent youths to 
the same facilities.
250
  Occasional appeals from orders of the Jerry M. trial 
 
245 Id. at 8. 
246 The Jerry M. defendants are the D.C. Government (including, in their official 
capacities, seven individuals from the Mayor to the superintendents of the District’s three 
secure facilities and their successors in office) and the D.C. Public Schools (including, in 
their official capacities, the superintendent and head of special education).  Jerry M. Consent 
Decree, supra note 2, at 40–41. 
247 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 6 (urging federal funding 
for incentives designed to attract college-educated workers into juvenile justice systems, and 
noting the presence of such incentives in child welfare). 
248 See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 27–30 (recommending that DYRS management 
develop and maintain strong relationships with line staff, further enhance staff training, and 
integrate school staff and therapists into other activities). 
249 See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 113, at 15 (considering “the courts” as an 
alternative to the traditional political process). 
250 Although the Jerry M. plaintiffs raised constitutional claims, they filed their 
complaint in D.C. Superior Court rather than federal court.  See text accompanying supra 
notes 16–22.  Given the history of judicial interventions described in this Section, the 
plaintiffs likely believed that local judges would be receptive to the complaint.  The local 
forum also avoids problems that might have arisen after the federal Prison Litigation Reform 
Act or the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne.  See text accompanying supra notes 118–20 
& 162. 
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judge involved yet another set of judges from the D.C. Court of Appeals.  
Even the phrase “Jerry M. trial judge” means the three different judges who 
at some point presided over Jerry M. during its twenty-six years and 
counting.
251
  This “plurality” of judges—i.e., the reality that multiple judges 
influence the same public policy at the same time—complicates juvenile 
conditions litigation, especially when different judges have different visions 
of the juvenile justice system’s purpose.252 
As a consequence, there exists a potential for great tension between 
judges and reform.  Two potential sources of conflict stand out.  First, 
family court judges have equitable powers that allow them to affect broader 
policies of juvenile justice through the disposition of a single delinquency 
case.  However, the principles of equity provide no clear rules to channel 
the judges’ powers to do justice by acting “in the best interests of the 
child.”253  When a judge’s equitable order interferes with another judge’s 
order, the conflict can deprive judicial action of coherence.  Second, in 
practice a consent decree as detailed as the one in Jerry M. operates as a 
contract, the terms of which differ from the government’s duties under any 
relevant statutes and the Constitution.
254
  Even at times when the District, 
under Schiraldi’s leadership, adopted a reform agenda that transcended the 
decree’s requirements, the Jerry M. court only concerned itself with the 
District’s obligations under the consent decree.255  Far from preserving 
equity’s essential flexibility, formalistic insistence on compliance with the 
decree can become self-defeating.
256
 
Putting Jerry M. aside momentarily, it is helpful to set out the extent, 
and the limits, of the power D.C.’s family court judges have.  In the 
 
251 See White et al., supra note 50, at 411 (noting that the first judge, Ricardo M. Urbina, 
accepted an appointment to the federal bench and was succeeded by Judge Richard A. 
Levie).  Currently, Judge Herbert B. Dixon presides over the case.  See, e.g., Jerry M. v. 
District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004). 
252 See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 66, at 7 (“[M]en, not Man, live on earth 
and inhabit the world.  While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to 
politics, this plurality is specifically the condition—not only the conditio sine qua non, but 
the conditio per quam—of all political life.”). 
253 D.C. CODE § 16-2320(c) (LexisNexis 2001) (authorizing the judge to choose among 
various remedial dispositions after a child has been adjudicated delinquent or in need of 
supervision).  For the Jerry M. judge’s views of this issue, see infra note 259. 
254 See Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 117, 122. 
255 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 286. 
256 See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The essence of equity 
jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to 
the necessities of the particular case.  Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.  The 
qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and 
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs . . . .”). 
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District, the court orders a youth who is detained awaiting trial to a 
placement, whether a secure facility or a community-based alternative.
257
  
After adjudicating a youth delinquent, the court places the youth in the 
custody of DYRS and loses all control over his subsequent placement; the 
agency has discretion to make the most appropriate available placement.
258
  
Further, in delinquency and abuse or neglect proceedings, family division 
judges often face dilemmas in evaluating a child’s needs and ordering 
appropriate relief, especially when the judges lack experience in the subject 
matter and when they do not trust the social workers and probation officers 
to ascertain or act in the best interests of children.
259
 
Upon its filing, the Jerry M. case was assigned to Hon. Ricardo 
Urbina, the presiding judge of the family division in D.C. Superior Court.  
Judge Urbina was also the coauthor of a contemporaneously published 
manual for new juvenile court judges; this manual provides some insight 
into Judge Urbina’s views—including his belief that a judge new to the 
family division docket would feel that legal training and professional 
experience had been poor preparation for the job.
260
  The manual begins 
with a hypothetical case: 
“Michael” is a 13 year old who has been in foster care since age 6 when his mother’s 
boyfriend abused him.  Michael is before the court for disposition of his first 
offense—he pled guilty to setting fire in his foster home.  He has been returned to his 
mother several times, but a second abusive boyfriend and her subsequent eviction and 
transient life among friends and homeless shelters have resulted in his removal.  
Michael is bright but frequently fights in school.  He is described by his worker as 
being “sad, lonely, and fearful with a hot temper.”  The defense attorney says Michael 
wants to live with his mother, and recommends closing the delinquency case.  The 
prosecutor feels that Michael is dangerous and unpredictable and wants him 
committed as a delinquent, although he is too young for the juvenile institution.  The 
neglect worker wants him out of that system because she can’t handle a “criminally-
 
257 See D.C. CODE § 16-2310. 
258 See In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 907 (D.C. 2003) (holding that the court lacks statutory 
authority to direct the treatment and placement of a delinquent youth who has been 
committed to the agency’s custody). 
259 See MARGARET BEYER & RICARDO URBINA, AN EMERGING JUDICIAL ROLE IN FAMILY 
COURT 1–2 (1986).  Coauthor Beyer was one of three experts on a panel created by the Jerry 
M. consent decree to design a continuum of care needed to reduce the number of youths held 
in secure confinement.  See District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 179 n.1, 181 
(D.C. 1990). 
260 See BEYER & URBINA, supra note 259, at 39 (“Judges wanting to keep within the 
mainstream of judicial thinking find that common law, statutes, and caselaw provide 
insufficient guidance about the limits of their mandate to protect the best interest of the 
child.”). 
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inclined adolescent.”  The probation officer thinks Michael is emotionally disturbed 
and recommends special placement.
261
 
What is the judge to do?
262
  The extent of the judge’s involvement in 
an individual child’s case is often a matter of judicial discretion and 
philosophy, with the typical judge becoming more involved when the 
workers appear less competent.
263
  In the course of ordering and supervising 
the government’s provision of services in the best interests of the child, a 
judge can self-consciously drive policy changes in service provision 
overall.
264
  Thus, experience in the family division can prime a judge for 
ordering dramatic interventions aimed at broad change.
265
 
Indeed, the history of judicial intervention to improve conditions of 
secure confinement for the District’s incarcerated youths is much older than 
Jerry M., and this history reveals a desire among some judges to drive 
systemic changes.
266
  The most far-reaching intervention began after a day 
in which four separate juveniles alleged in Judge Gladys Kessler’s 
courtroom that they had been victims of serious mistreatment during their 
confinement at Cedar Knoll.
267
  Acting on her “plain duty to discover what 
 
261 Id. at 1–2; see also Emily Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and What Lawyers and 
Judges Can Do About It, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2011) (decrying the absence of a 
meaningful role for the child in hearings like this one). 
262 In at least one respect, this is a simple case because the youth is both culpable and in 
need of services.  See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding 
Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 284, 293 (2007) (arguing that 
juveniles’ advocates are more likely than those of adults to be ineffective, “juvenile court 
culture frowns upon zealous advocacy,” and juvenile defendants are more likely to plead 
guilty without understanding the meaning or consequences of a plea).  Delinquency is 
sometimes used as a tactic to secure services that are otherwise unavailable.  See ANNIE E. 
CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 5 (“Juvenile courts and corrections systems 
have become a dumping ground for youth with mental health problems, abuse and neglect 
histories, and learning disabilities who should be served by public systems with specialized 
expertise in addressing these problems.”); BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON YOUTH SAFETY & 
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN D.C., FINAL REPORT 20 (Nov. 6, 2001) [hereinafter BLUE 
RIBBON COMM’N], available at https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/oakhill/documents-
and-resources/blue-ribbon-commission/ (referring to “[t]he apparent excessive use of 
commitment as a strategy to secure services”). 
263 See BEYER & URBINA, supra note 259, at 3, 30. 
264 See id. at 30 (illustrating how judges can “include making systemic changes part of 
their role” by issuing careful directives to social workers and probation officers). 
265 For a sample of remedial orders issued in Jerry M., see supra text accompanying 
notes 50–57. 
266 See, e.g., United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 979, 982–83 (D.D.C. 1971) 
(requiring the construction of an additional facility for incarceration of young adults up to 
age twenty-two, in order to alleviate overcrowding and provide for rehabilitation). 
267 In re An Inquiry Into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at and 
Committed at Cedar Knoll Inst., 430 A.2d 1087, 1088–89 (D.C. 1981).  The four juveniles 
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is happening to the children” and declaring that the allegations described a 
“horror . . . almost beyond belief,” Judge Kessler convened six fact-finding 
hearings over a seven-month period.
268
  At the end of the inquiry, Judge 
Kessler issued “a comprehensive order mandating sweeping changes” at the 
secure facilities.
269
  The District appealed the order, arguing that the trial 
court exceeded its authority and that the evidence from the hearings did not 
warrant the order.
270
  Mindful of separation of powers concerns and noting 
that the District had since released the four youths from its custody, the 




While Jerry M. was underway 1994, another judge intervened on 
behalf of youths held for overnight stays at the Receiving Home for 
Children pending their initial appearances.
272
  Following seven youths’ 
claims that they were given little or no food during a weekend stay, Judge 
George W. Mitchell made a personal, unannounced visit to the Receiving 
Home.
273
  City lawyers believed they had successfully rebutted the youths’ 
allegation, but Judge Mitchell found the conditions “unacceptable for a 
civilized country.”274  He ordered its nearly immediate closure, giving the 
District one week to provide for the custody of arrested youths on nights 
and weekends.
275
  But Judge Mitchell was not acting in a closed universe.  
 
“recounted incidents of physical abuse and sexual assaults by counselors; physical attacks 
and beatings by other juveniles which are allowed to occur because of inadequate 
supervision; drug abuse by both students and counselors and distribution of narcotics to 
students by counselors; administration of prescription drugs by untrained personnel; and, 
instances where juveniles who were clearly in need of medical attention were denied access 
to treatment by counselors.”  Id. at 1089. 
268 Id. at 1089 (quoting trial court order of Sept. 26, 1977).  Without certifying a class of 
plaintiffs, Judge Kessler appointed the Public Defender Service to represent all juveniles 
confined in the facility for the inquiry’s purposes.  Id. at 1088, 1089. 
269 Id. at 1088. 
270 Id. at 1090. 
271 Id. at 1090–92; see also id. at 1094 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (“In calling this case moot, 
my colleagues would force the trial court into the untenable position of either having to place 
a child in an inhumane facility while ordering the conditions improved, or of removing the 
child and allowing the conditions that forced the removal to go uncorrected.”). 
272 E.g., Lubow & Tulman, supra note 202, at xx. 
273 Nancy Lewis, D.C. Judge Orders Shutdown of Children’s Receiving Home, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 18, 1995, at B1.  At the time, Judge Mitchell was the head of the Family 
Division.  Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Judge Mitchell required that a replacement facility include “‘[a] place for the children 
to eat other than in their hands and with their fingers’ and a ‘place where the food can be 
placed other than the floor.’”  Id. (quoting Judge Mitchell’s order).  “‘This place, where you 
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With the Receiving Home shuttered, the District kept children at Oak Hill 
pending initial appearance; as a result, Oak Hill’s daily population swelled 




At other times, judges advanced policies in direct conflict with key 
Jerry M. goals.  For example, the Jerry M. lawsuit is partly an effort to end 
the District’s unnecessary overconfinement of youths who did not warrant 
secure placements.
277
  Yet as DYRS sharply reduced the duration of secure 
confinement for lower-level offenders, some judges balked; they brought 
their views in private to city councilmembers, who interrogated Schiraldi 
about the new policy at a public hearing.
278
  Additionally, although the 
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) sought judges’ 
participation in establishing standards defining the limited cases in which 
secure detention is appropriate,
279
 individual judges were apparently able to 
disregard the standards.
280
  To be fair, the judges expressed concern that the 
continuum of less restrictive, community-based placements “was not fully 
implemented as designed and . . . as a result, youth in the community were 
not getting the needed range of services.”281  But despite the availability of 
forums such as JDAI, tension between the two groups was a significant 
obstacle to successful implementation of new initiatives.
282
  Judges and 
DYRS management reported that “they often had different views about how 
to best serve youth, . . . the types of youth that are most in need of secure 
placement, and the adequacy of the placement options.”283 
 
are keeping these children, is appalling and is unfit to house animals of a lower level,’ 
Mitchell said, his voice rising with revival fervor.”  Id. 
276 See RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 17. 
277 Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 51–52; see supra text accompanying notes 23–
27. 
278 See Pierre, supra note 153, at B1 (describing how Schiraldi “was summoned before 
the council’s Committee on Human Services to answer questions raised, mostly in private, 
by judges, prosecutors and community groups about whether his agency was releasing 
youths too soon”). 
279 See MENDEL, TWO DECADES OF JDAI, supra note 208, at 26. 
280 See DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS. (D.C.), supra note 201, at 2 (“The number of 
commitments in 2005 vastly exceeded the 2004 total of 144, even though there was a 
decrease in the number of juvenile arrests.  The increase appears largely to have resulted 
from the high levels of commitments by one judge sitting for the first time on juvenile cases 
in the past year and a half.”). 
281 DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 19. 
282 Id. at 21 (stating that trust eroded after the city council enacted a law, which DYRS 
did not seek, and that judges resented because it limited their authority to order specific types 
of placements). 
283 Id. at 20. 
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For the sake of argument, I assume that the judges’ dim view of the 
DYRS community-based alternatives is accurate.
284
  But why?  Although 
Schiraldi never offered Jerry M. as an excuse, he did characterize it as a 
major distraction.
285
  After noting that one of his first acts as director was to 
pay a massive sum of overdue contempt fines, Schiraldi said: 
[F]rankly, if I could have paid $3.6 million and the lawyers and the monitor would 
have just gone away and allowed me to set my own priorities, it would have been a 
bargain.  The lawsuit forced me to focus more on the minutia of improving conditions 
over deinstitutionalization and the creation of a workable network of community 
programs.  The litigants, none of whom were managers, never understood that in a 
system that deep in a hole, it was impossible to prioritize all fronts simultaneously.  
Given choices, they would consistently prioritize what they knew best and where the 
law provided the most readily available remedies—conditions issues—despite the fact 
that most of them admitted that the institution-based system was itself inherently 
flawed and that the remedy most needed was watershed change and 
deinstitutionalization, not a new coat of paint on a failed, institutional model.
286
 
Of course, such a statement must be considered in light of the long 
experience of the lawsuit.  Once the Jerry M. judge observed that orders 
and threats of even worse punishment were the only tools that seemed to 
have any effect, it would be natural to respond with increasingly specific 
orders.
287
  And some of the Jerry M. requirements—most prominently, the 
straightforward mandate to close Cedar Knoll by December 1, 1987—
afforded the District a great deal of flexibility, which it failed to use 
advantageously.
288
  Perhaps the best approach for the court presiding over 
an institutional reform lawsuit is to be decisive and general on what must be 




284 See Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, Released, Yes. Rehabilitated, Not So Much., WASH. POST, 
Oct. 25, 2008, at A15 (charging that under Schiraldi, DYRS prematurely released offenders 
who had not been rehabilitated and then inadequately supervised them in the community).  
King, whose frequent columns on juvenile justice often expressed the views shared by some 
judges, also believed DYRS badly erred in limiting the size of New Beginnings to sixty 
beds.  See id. 
285 See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 6. 
286 Id. 
287 See Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 551 (D.D.C. 1997) (structural reform litigation 
involving the District’s mental health system) (“[T]he repeated failure of the District to 
comply with the court’s orders eliminates any basis for judicial restraint when remedying 
noncompliance.”); Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 19, at 1823–24 (discussing Jerry M.). 
288 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
289 See DiIulio, What Judges Can Do, supra note 91, at 308 (describing the approach of 
Judge Lasker to a prison lawsuit in New York City). 
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D. MEDIA 
Of course, the press is not charged with implementing juvenile justice 
reform.
290
  But public perceptions of the juvenile justice system (and 
politicians’ beliefs about these perceptions) frame the ways in which 
politicians act towards the juvenile justice system.
291
  These political 
attitudes remain vitally important even when an institution is involved in a 
lawsuit. 
Through the news media, an institutional reform lawsuit brings public 
attention to the conditions that are the basis of the suit.
292
  Potentially, this 
attention gives institutional reform plaintiffs a second path to success: even 
if the lawsuit does not reform the system directly, the litigation can succeed 
by generating news coverage that prods political leaders to pursue reform 
on their own.
293
  As one public defender put it, a conditions lawsuit and in-
depth investigative reporting bring public attention to “the horrible things 
we do to children incarcerated at facilities with pleasant-sounding names 
such as ‘Cedar Knoll’ on ‘Jolly Acres Road’ and the ‘Oak Hill Youth 
 
290 But see NEUSTADT, supra note 139, at 28–29 (positing that, because executive power 
is a matter of persuasion rather than command, “[m]any public purposes can only be 
achieved by voluntary acts of private institutions; the press, for one . . . , is a ‘fourth branch 
of government’”) (citing DOUGLAS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1959)). 
291 BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, YOUTH 
VIOLENCE MYTHS AND REALITIES: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 12–13 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/PublicationFiles/Casey Youth ReportFinES.pdf (finding that in 
the District, “newspapers highlighted crime increases and often call for a quick response 
from city leaders,” who responded with emergency legislation imposing a 10 p.m. youth 
curfew, giving police access to confidential juvenile records, and denying bail for certain 
alleged offenses); see also Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 642–43 (summarizing the 
1980s and 1990s trend toward sensationalizing crimes committed by remorseless juvenile 
superpredators and the effect of this reporting on nationwide adoption of laws facilitating the 
prosecution of youth offenders in adult criminal courts).  Tanenhaus and Drizin charge that 
the mainstream media has perpetuated a myth that juvenile courts were never designed for 
serious violent crime.  See id. at 644.  Their review of recently rediscovered records of 
11,000 homicides in Chicago between 1870 and 1930 shows that early juvenile courts 
adjudicated murder cases.  See id. at 648–49 (citing HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO 1870–1930, 
http://homicide.northwestern.edu/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012)). 
292 See Sturm, supra note 95, at 670 (“Litigation has also generated considerable media 
coverage of prison conditions.  Virtually every case study reports extensive media coverage 
of the litigation and the conditions and practices in the targeted institutions.” (citations 
omitted)). 
293 See id. (stating that, in the adult prison context, news coverage of litigation “is widely 
credited with increasing public awareness of the inadequacies in correctional institutions and 
acceptance of the need for reform”). 
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Center.’”294  Yet the public attention may come to focus on issues other 
than those most important to the lawsuit.  Further, there are no guarantees 
that media coverage will remain favorable to reformers as they implement a 
decree, especially if doing so entails politically controversial action. 
Since the beginning of Jerry M., there has been no shortage of stories 
informing the public of the problems in the District’s juvenile justice 
agency.
295
  But once that story has been told, it is no longer novel; reporters 
searching for scoops must either dig deeper or look elsewhere.  Updates on 
the litigation’s progress can certainly be newsworthy; however, after the 
parties have agreed to a consent decree, coverage of litigation is likely 
confined to implementation failures, not successes.
296
  Later news coverage 
of the District’s agency shifted focus to assessing the lawsuit’s impact on 
city hall politics.
297
  At one point, Jerry M. was a story of improper 
government contracting;
298
 at another, of a judge’s dramatic request for a 
meeting with the mayor.
299
  While valuable as news reporting, stories on 
such side issues are unlikely to spur politicians to embark on ambitious 
institutional reforms.  Such stories also divert attention from the persistence 
of intolerable conditions in facilities and the merits of deinstitutionalization. 
Further, negative media coverage can quickly undercut political 
support for reform.
300
  In the District, media coverage of escapes, whether 
 
294 Diane Shust, Op-Ed, They Call It ‘Juvenile Justice,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1986, at 
C8. 
295 After plaintiffs filed the original complaint and before the parties agreed to the 
consent decree, the Washington Post ran a two-part, front-page series of thoroughly reported 
stories.  See Weiser, Delinquents, supra note 222; Weiser, Youth Facility Policy, supra note 
79. 
296 The news reports cited throughout this Comment support this point.  For a rare story 
on a positive development in the litigation, see Henri Cauvin, Blog, Improved Juvenile Ward 
Education: D.C. Report, WASH. POST (Jul. 8, 2010, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/improved-juvenile-ward-education-
dc-report/2010/12/20/ABFPCDG_blog.html (“In a new report filed today, the monitor 
overseeing a court-ordered reform of the District’s juvenile justice agency said the city had 
has [sic] staged a ‘remarkable’ turnaround in how it educates juveniles in long-term 
detention.”). 
297 See, e.g., Sandra Evans, City Hall Notebook: Budget Bodes Ill for Unfortunates in 
City Institutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1986, at DC1 (noting the folly of a budget proposal 
that defunded all operations at Cedar Knoll—which the city had committed to close—and 
failed to create any alternatives). 
298 E.g., Benjamin Weiser, Youth Contracts Kept Despite Allegations, WASH. POST, June 
27, 1986, at B1. 
299 E.g., Lewis, supra note 57. 
300 Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 5 (“The press became a serious problem over 
time.  Although we got uniformly terrific press initially, and some members of the media 
like the Post’s editorial board and the Kojo Nnamdi show were consistently supportive 
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staff-aided or not, repeatedly undermined confidence in agency 
management.
301
  So did coverage of sensational crimes involving youths 
who had been at one time or another in DYRS custody.
302
  Part IV.G tells a 
story in which relentless media criticism influenced a political decision to 
replace reform-minded agency management. 
When reformers are in the position of agency management, they face a 
twofold public relations problem.  First, so long as they remain subject to 
the control of the political branches, they cannot afford to lose public 
support or allow public attitudes favoring incarceration to overwhelm those 
receptive to rehabilitation.
303
  Second, reformers can expect negative news 
coverage of their failures, but juvenile confidentiality laws may constrain 
the agency’s ability to respond effectively to bad-news stories.304 
In summary, an agency can earn positive news coverage of its 
successes outside the corrections lawsuit, but such stories by their nature 
will appear with less frequency.
305
  Plaintiffs in juvenile justice litigation 
should not expect media coverage over the long run to favor reform over 
institutionalization. 
 
throughout my tenure, all you have to do is ‘google’ my name to get a sense of some of the 
negative press I received during my time at DYRS, coverage which colors the ‘verdict’ on 
the reforms to this day.”). 
301 E.g., Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, A Grieving Mother Left in the Dark, WASH. POST, June 
26, 2010, at A15 (decrying the department’s supervision of youths in community-based 
placements); Elsa Walsh, Crawford Sharply Criticizes Youth Facilities, WASH. POST, Sept. 
25, 1987, at C1 (reporting that a key legislator “sharply criticized” management in response 
to a report that 25% of youths escaped secure confinement at Oak Hill). 
302 E.g., King, supra note 301, at A15 (reporting that a murder victim’s mother said, 
“DYRS ‘is a breeding ground for vile offenders to freely walk away and commit some of the 
most unspeakable crimes imaginable.’”). 
303 See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 291, at iv-v (finding complexity in public opinion 
toward youth rehabilitation and observing that media coverage has a large influence on 
attitudes toward youth offenders). 
304 E.g., Editorial, Secrecy Run Amok, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A18 (referring to a 
murder case in which “Maryland authorities released arrest records of the three suspects 
charged . . . while D.C. officials were constrained in even acknowledging the youths were 
under the supervision of youth rehabilitation services”); see also Drizin & Luloff, supra note 
262, at 309 (arguing that the absence of media observers from juvenile proceedings 
contributes to an incorrect public perception that “the juvenile court is a place where children 
are not punished and [are] allowed to commit crimes without any repercussions”). 
305 Harlan, supra note 238 (profiling a group of DYRS youths during an eight-day 
wilderness trip, and noting that the newspaper agreed not to publish information about the 
youths’ offenses). 
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E. THE LEGISLATURE 
In an influential article on the politics of criminal law, the late 
Professor Stuntz distinguished “surface politics,” which lead legislatures to 
react to the ebb and flow of public opinion, from “deep politics,” in which 
legislatures cooperate and compete with other governmental institutions.
306
  
Stuntz argued that only deep politics—specifically, an institutional alliance 
of legislators and prosecutors that appellate courts cannot resist—truly 




Stuntz recognized only two major exceptions to criminal law’s 
expansion: the repeal of Prohibition and the criminal code revisions 
inspired by the Model Penal Code.
308
  But we should rank the advent of 
juvenile justice as a third exception.  Ever since legislatures created the first 
juvenile courts, juvenile justice has stood uncomfortably alongside criminal 
law.
309
  The states’ juvenile court acts substantially narrowed criminal law’s 
scope when they insulated children from the cruelty of criminal punishment 
for their criminal acts.  It is no accident that an entire species of modern 
tough-on-crime legislation—the transfer laws embodying the sound bite 
“adult time for adult crimes”—consists of expanding criminal law’s scope 
by eroding juvenile court jurisdiction.
310
  The political “accident” is that 
criminal law reformers (including some crucially important trial judges, 




Quibbles aside, Stuntz’s analysis remains penetrating.  His distinction 
between surface politics and deep politics guides the following discussion. 
 
306 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 509–10 (2001). 
307 Id. at 525, 528. 
308 Id. at 525 n.93. 
309 See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 645–49; see also Scott R. Hechinger, 
Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 
35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 444–64 (2011) (arguing that, in the current political 
climate, it is possible for congressional action to spur an important reform of youth-crime 
policy). 
310 See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 664–66. 
311 See Gwen Hoerr McNamee, The Origin of the Cook County Juvenile Court, in A 
NOBLE SOCIAL EXPERIMENT? THE FIRST 100 YEARS OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT, 
1899–1999, at 14, 18 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee ed., 1999); Hammer, supra note 87, at 928–
30. 
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1. Surface Politics 
Public opinion about youth crime is complex.  In one poll, 91% of 
American voters agreed that youth crime “is a major problem in our 
communities,” and barely one-third felt the juvenile justice system was 
effective in getting youths to stop committing violent or nonviolent 
crimes.
312
  Taken alone, these answers might suggest that getting tougher on 
youth crime would be popular with the public.  But 89% agreed that 
“[r]ehabilitative services and treatment for incarcerated youth can help 
prevent future crimes.”313  And when asked which policy responses are 
“highly effective” ways to reduce youth crime, voters favored rehabilitative 
approaches over tougher punishment.
314
  Thus, the public appears to believe 
both that a serious youth-crime problem exists and that the best response 
entails far more than reflexive punishment. 
Media portrayals can have as much effect on public perception of 
youth crime as actual youth-crime trends do.
315
  In the District, youth crime 
received extensive media coverage beginning in 2003, when a series of 
high-profile crimes involved a wave of “kiddie car thieves” and fatal 
shootings by teens of innocent bystanders, including other teens.
316
  Despite 
these high-profile crimes, the District’s youth-crime rate was dramatically 




312 BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD YOUTH CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
2–3 (2007), available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/zogby_feb07.pdf.  Zogby 
International conducted this telephone poll of 1,043 randomly selected voters using validated 
weighting and sampling procedures.  The margin of error was +/– 3.1 percentage points.  Id. 
at 2. 
313 Id. at 3. 
314 Id. at 6.  The approaches are as follows (with the share rating them “highly effective” 
in parentheses): increasing education and job skills training for youths in the juvenile justice 
system (75%); increasing prevention services for youths in the community before they get in 
trouble (71%); increasing counseling and substance abuse treatment through the juvenile 
justice system (54%); harsher penalties for offenders under age 18 (33%); and prosecuting 
more youths in the adult criminal justice system (26%). 
315 See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 291, at 2–3. 
316 RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 10; Sewell Chan, Shooting Highlights Crime 
Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at C1. 
317 JEFFREY A. BUTTS, URBAN INSTIT., JUVENILE CRIME IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 3 & tbl.1 
(Dec. 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310910_JuvenileCrimeDC.pdf 
(reporting that overall juvenile arrests increased in the District from 2002 to 2003, but the 
2003 arrest figures still represented a 38% decrease in overall juvenile arrests since 1995).  
Butts’s report appeared in December 2003 as a reply to punitive policy responses to the 
youth-crime issue.  See id. at 1–2.  Examining data from 1995 to 2007 (with the benefit of 
hindsight), Krisberg found that the juvenile arrest rate for violent offenses had peaked at 529 
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But the initial legislative responses acted on the news, not the data.
318
  
Councilmembers proposed legislation to get tough on youth crime, for 
example by punishing parents of delinquent children.
319
  Most prominently, 
Mayor Anthony Williams introduced an omnibus juvenile justice act.
320
  
The mayor’s proposal incorporated a few of the reforms recommended in 
2001 by his Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice 
Reform, but the bill also contained expansive provisions to make 
prosecuting youths in criminal court easier and to get tough on youth 
offenders and their parents.
321
  The mayor’s proposal received strong 
support from prosecutors, including both the District’s corporation counsel 
and the United States Attorney’s Office.322 
 
per 100,000 youths in 1996, bottomed out at 218 in 2002, and then rose before appearing to 
level off at 399 in 2007.  KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 291, at 28–29. 
318 Cf. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: 
An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 735 (2010) 
(arguing that the cumulative effect of legislative reactions to “some upsetting crime in the 
news” deprives criminal codes of coherence and rationality).  Or, as another observer has put 
it, “there are far more bills introduced in every legislative session that need to die than need 
to pass.”  ASHWORTH, supra note 5, at 3; see id. at 2–5 (explaining the dynamics of “bad ol’ 
bills” and the combination of benefits and low costs for legislators who sponsor them). 
319 E.g., Juvenile Justice and Parental Accountability Amendment Act of 2003, B. 15-
460, §§ 2, 6 (introduced by Councilmember Chavous) (proposing, inter alia, to impose a 
mandatory fine on the parent of a delinquent child and to authorize the mayor to suspend the 
parent’s driver’s license depending on the severity of the offense or number of 
adjudications); see also Juvenile Justice Act of 2003, B. 15-574 (introduced by 
Councilmember Mendelson) (proposing procedural changes that would have the effect of 
transferring more youths to the criminal system). 
320 Omnibus Juvenile Justice, Victim’s Rights and Parental Participation Act of 2003, B. 
15-537 (introduced at the mayor’s request). 
321 Id.  In a scaled-back form, the mayor’s bill adopted the commission’s 
recommendations to add a purpose clause to the Juvenile Court Act; release “children in 
need of supervision” (i.e., truants and runaways) instead of incarcerating them; evaluate the 
effect of rehabilitative services on delinquent youths; and create individualized treatment 
plans for each delinquent youth.  Id. at tit. I, IX–XI.  The mayor’s bill also proposed to allow 
prosecutors to share confidential information about juveniles; facilitate the transfer of 
juveniles accused of violent offenses to the criminal system; restrict judges’ ability to 
dismiss delinquency cases when the child is not in need of rehabilitation; create a new 
juvenile offense for failing to appear at a delinquency hearing; grant victims the right to 
participate in a delinquency hearing; authorize courts to order delinquent juveniles or their 
parents to pay restitution; and require parents to participate in their children’s rehabilitation 
plans, under pain of contempt.  Id. at tit. III–IV, VI–VIII, XII; see also Letter from Anthony 
A. Williams, Mayor, D.C. to Linda W. Cropp, Chairman, Council of D.C. (Oct. 31, 2003) 
(accompanying the bill and explaining its rationale). 
322 COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 15-527, “OMNIBUS 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2004,” at 25–29, 31–34 (2004) [hereinafter “REPORT 
ON BILL 15-527”] (summarizing testimony from prosecutors).  In the District, the U.S. 
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But the punitive legislation was opposed by a coalition of youth 
advocates who had successfully organized themselves earlier to influence 
the commission.
323
  Now the coalition turned to getting the council to pay 
attention to the commission’s report.324  The commission’s 
recommendations—including its most concrete proposal, the closure of Oak 
Hill—purposefully aligned with Jerry M.’s goal of transitioning to smaller, 
safer facilities designed for rehabilitation rather than warehousing.
325
  At the 
coalition’s urging, Councilmember Adrian Fenty introduced a bill based 
closely on the commission’s recommendations.326 
In the end, the commission’s recommendations were a major influence 
on the bill that came out of committee.
327
  Having set out to get tough in 
response to growing fears about youth crime, the council adopted a more 
balanced omnibus bill that required replacing the crumbling Oak Hill 
facility with a new, rehabilitation-oriented model.
328
 
Again, Stuntz was right to describe surface politics as an “ebb and 
flow.”329  The confluence of political factors that produced this legislative 
act was bound to change.
330
  As Jerome Miller might have put it: Even if 
 
Attorney prosecutes all crimes except misdemeanors; the District’s corporation counsel 
(since renamed the District’s attorney general) brings delinquency petitions. 
323 The Justice for D.C. Youth Coalition consisted of national advocacy groups, 
including the Youth Law Center and the Justice Policy Institute, as well as local service 
organizations such as the Latin American Youth Center and the Alliance of Concerned Men.  
RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 10. 
324 One councilmember, apparently unaware of the Blue Ribbon Commission and its 
2001 report, introduced a bill “[t]o establish a Juvenile Justice Task Force for the purpose of 
recommending improvements in the District of Columbia’s criminal justice system as it 
applies to juveniles.”  See Juvenile Justice Task Force Establishment Act of 2003, B. 15-573 
(introduced by Councilmember Brazil). 
325 See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, supra note 262, at 14–15 (framing the commission’s 
recommendation to close Oak Hill as “a new rallying cry” to satisfy the city’s obligations 
under the Jerry M. consent decree). 
326 Blue Ribbon Juvenile Justice and Youth Rehabilitation Act of 2004, B. 15-673 
(introduced by Councilmember Fenty); see RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 10–11. 
327 RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 22.  Councilmember Kathy Patterson, chair of 
the council’s judiciary committee, made significant changes to the omnibus bill that 
tempered its punitive aspects and incorporated more of the commission’s report.  See 
REPORT ON BILL 15-527, supra note 322, at 9. 
328 See Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 1188, D.C. Law 15-261 
(effective Mar. 17, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE § 24-941 (LexisNexis 2001)); REPORT ON 
BILL 15-527, supra note 322, at 16–21. 
329 Stuntz, supra note 306, at 510. 
330 For one, the union representing Oak Hill’s correctional staff had no involvement in 
this debate.  Later, the union would make its position on reforms clearly known.  E.g., Elissa 
Silverman, Brown Wins Endorsement of Union for Youth Jailers, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2006, 
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surface politics can allow reform to begin, they will also ensure that 
sustained support for reform “will not be based on results, but will be a 
matter of chance, of happenstance, of politics and mood.”331 
2. Deep Politics 
In the surface-politics story of legislative responses to public opinion, 
Jerry M. had a quiet presence largely confined to the background.  But from 
the perspective of deep politics, the lawsuit’s existence alters the power 
balance among the institutions of government.  This rebalancing does not 
flow from the court’s orders, and its effect is noticeable even when the court 
does not order the legislature to take action. 
The most obvious illustration of this effect is the legislature’s common 
and well-documented tendency to increase the budget of the target agency 
in an institutional reform lawsuit.
332
  The District’s city council needed only 
a cursory reference to Jerry M. to approve budget increases for the youth 
corrections agency.
333
  But what accounts for the legislature’s usual 
readiness to reward troubled agencies with additional resources? 
Because its members are publicly accountable, a legislature seeks to 
avoid blame.
334
  Conveniently, a legislature cannot be blamed for 
institutional reform litigation arising from faulty execution of the law.  But 
when it appears that inadequate funding is a cause of the agency’s 
compliance problems, the legislature becomes exposed to a risk of blame.  
 
at B4 (reporting that the union representing line staff at Oak Hill endorsed Michael A. 
Brown in his campaign for mayor “because he supports its calls for the dismissal of 
department Director Vincent Schiraldi”). 
331 MILLER, supra note 6, at 226. 
332 See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 89, at 562–63.  With so many D.C. human services 
agencies operating under some form of court supervision, a leading local policy advocate 
counted the existence of a reform lawsuit as the first factor to consider when analyzing their 
proposed budgets.  See Susie Cambria, An Objective Tool to Assess the Mayor’s Budget and 
the Council’s Changes, SUSIE’S BUDGET & POL’Y CORNER (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://susiecambria.blogspot.com/2011/01/objective-tool-to-assess-mayors-budget.html. 
333 See, e.g., Fiscal Year 2005 Operating Cash Reserve Allocation Emergency Act of 
2005, 52 D.C. Reg. 3162 (Apr. 1, 2005) (authorizing DYRS to spend, in addition to its 
approved annual budget, nearly $3.3 million “to cover increased costs of court ordered 
requirements”).  This supplemental funding increased DYRS’s $51.7 million budget by 
about 6.4%.  Cf. GOV’T OF D.C., 2 FY 2005 PROPOSED BUDGET AND FINANCIAL PLAN E-7 
(June 21, 2004), available at http://cfo.dc.gov/cfo/LIB/cfo/budget/2005/pdf/pbfp05_e_
hss.pdf (using the term “Youth and Adolescent program” to refer to DYRS). 
334 See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 113, at 3, 28–29 (illustrating policy approaches in 
other contexts that insulate legislative bodies from blame). 
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In that case, the legislature will typically perceive eliminating the risk of 
blame as worth the cost of giving the agency additional funding.
335
 
As a practical matter, the court’s involvement constrains the 
legislature’s allocation of fiscal resources.336  The lawsuit’s constraint is 
akin to the constraints imposed by federal mandates, voter-imposed tax and 
expenditure limits, or economic down-cycles.
337
  The legislature can 
perceive the constraint’s existence whenever the agency says its funding is 
inadequate to comply with the decree—whether or not the court has gone so 
far as to specifically order additional appropriations. 
Likewise, the Jerry M. court had not ordered the District to close Oak 
Hill when the council enacted its statutory mandate to do so; the idea came 
from the 2001 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth Safety and 
Juvenile Justice Reform.
338
  But the participation of the commission’s 
chairman, Judge Eugene Hamilton, gave the report an unmistakable judicial 
imprimatur.
339
  Two years later, when surface politics prompted the council 
to do something about the youth-crime problem, the council stood exposed 
to blame if it ignored the commission’s recommendations.  The council’s 
statutory mandate and the judiciary’s perceived support for it left Mayor 
Williams with little room to maneuver; his next budget funded a $34.2 
million capital project to replace Oak Hill.
340
 
However, in this deep politics story, the court’s support for reform 
means more to the legislature and the executive than it does to the public.  
Early in Jerry M.’s history, it was clear that deinstitutionalization plans 
 
335 When the additional funding would cause or exacerbate a fiscal crisis (i.e., any 
moment of acute resource scarcity requiring a reordering of major policy priorities), the cost 
becomes prohibitive and the legislature may not be moved to act.  Thus, the court’s 
involvement in Jerry M. had little budgetary impact during the District’s period of fiscal 
insolvency from roughly 1993 to 2000; the city lacked both the money to fund priorities and 
the management capacity to order priorities. 
336 From the perspective of the legislature as a funding decisionmaker, this is a “first-
order” constraint because the decision has been taken out of the legislature’s hands and 
treated as a given.  See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 19–21 (1978) 
(differentiating between first- and second-order changes). 
337 See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SOUND 
STATE BUDGETING PRACTICES, at ch. 2 (1995), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/budget-tax/fundamentals-of-sound-state-budgeting-practices.aspx#constrain. 
338 See supra text accompanying notes 319–28. 
339 Judge Hamilton was the chief judge of the D.C. Superior Court from 1993 until 
assuming senior status in 2000 after thirty years on the bench.  Emily Langer & Keith L. 
Alexander, Obituary, Judge Sat Atop D.C. Superior Court Bench, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 
2011, at B6. 
340 COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., supra note 198, at 15–16 & n.6; DALY 
ET AL., supra note 47, at 2 (referring to Oak Hill’s closure in May 2009). 
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would face a major obstacle: NIMBY opposition from residents opposed to 
establishing group homes and other community-based alternatives to 
confinement in their neighborhoods, coupled with an absence of sparsely 
populated areas in such a compact city.
341
  In an op-ed published in the 
Washington Post, three court-appointed experts sought to persuade the 
city’s residents to accept group homes and troubled youths in their 
neighborhoods; so far as one can tell, their argument had absolutely no 
effect on public opinion.
342
  Like any other political actor, the court’s 
influence has potential and limits. 
F. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
The difficulties agency managers face in obtaining reliable information 
about operations or issuing orders and having them executed are 
compounded at the chief executive level.
343
  As a practical matter, a chief 
executive’s role in juvenile corrections litigation is limited to only a few 





341 See, e.g., Virginia Mansfield, Barry Says More Group Homes Will Open Throughout 
the City, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1985, at DC1 (describing hostility in many neighborhoods to 
community-based placement of delinquent youths, prisoners, foster children, and people 
with mental illness or developmental disabilities).  I embrace Lydia DePillis’s descriptive 
(rather than pejorative) use of the label: 
NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard.  As in, “I don’t object to this [homeless shelter/windmill/trash 
transfer station/Walmart/meth clinic] in principle, but I’d rather not have to deal with it in my 
neighborhood.”  That definition holds true even for the people who would add, “because my 
neighborhood is already a dumping ground for that kind of crap” or “it’s just not the right place 
for that kind of thing.” 
Lydia DePillis, What I Talk About When I Talk About NIMBYism, WASH. CITY PAPER (Aug. 
2, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2011/08/
02/what-i-talk-about-when-i-talk-about-nimbyism/ (brackets in original). 
342 See Marty Beyer, Robert E. Brown & Paul DeMuro, Op-Ed, How to Help 
Delinquents Help Themselves, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1987, at D8.  The three coauthors were 
the members of the Jerry M. panel; see text accompanying supra note 27. 
343 See, e.g., NEUSTADT, supra note 139, at 34–35 (describing the institutional 
antagonism between a president and cabinet members, who respond to different 
constituencies). 
344 Id. at 7–8 (conceiving of the presidential role as that of a mere clerk, who labors to 
administer formalities (such as signing bills or executive orders) on behalf of the subordinate 
departments that actually perform work).  On the distinction between labor and work, see 
ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 66, at 7, 144–152. 
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Depending on the circumstances, a chief executive might either 
welcome or resist an institutional reform lawsuit.
345
  Newly elected 
executives are especially likely to embrace a lawsuit because doing so tends 
not to reflect poorly on their own administration’s record.346  But even an 
incumbent executive can find cooperating with the lawsuit advantageous. 
In 1986, with Mayor Marion Barry facing a genuine challenge for a 
third term in office, one might have expected some hostility towards the 
Jerry M. plaintiffs from an administration keen to avoid negative news 
coverage of another lawsuit.
347
  Instead, Mayor Barry was generally 
receptive to negotiating with plaintiffs.
348
  The election provided an extra 
reason for him to negotiate a consent decree quickly, because a lengthy trial 
on juvenile corrections conditions would only “keep[] public attention 
focused on the problems of the city during the campaign season.”349  By 
1989, when the Jerry M. court began fining the District for its 
contemptuous failure to comply with the decree, Barry felt free to openly 
deny the lawsuit’s legitimacy.350  Especially to the extent that these events 
destroyed the District’s credibility with the court, the conduct of the first-




345 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1062–63 (mentioning instances where elected 
executives, including D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams, conceded the deficiencies of public 
institutions and welcomed litigation as a means of correcting problems). 
346 Id. at 1063. 
347 At the time, many of the District’s public care systems operated under court 
oversight.  See Toni Locy, In D.C., It’s Often Government by Decree, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 
1994, at A1 (stating that Barry’s successor, Mayor Sharon Pratt (née Kelly), was 
confrontational and uncooperative towards institutional reform lawsuits generally). 
348 See id. (quoting Peter Nickles, whose work at the time included representation of 
plaintiffs in separate reform suits involving mental health and prison systems, assessing 
Barry’s involvement).  But cf. id. (stating that judges in the suits “have blamed the former 
mayor [Barry] for the deterioration of some city agencies, which hindered compliance with 
the decrees”). 
349 Engel & Weiser, supra note 165, at B1.  Barry went on to win reelection to a third 
four-year term, which was a disaster.  See HARRY S. JAFFE & TOM SHERWOOD, DREAM CITY: 
RACE, POWER, AND THE DECLINE OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 176–199, 230–268 (1994) 
(chronicling Barry’s out-of-control drug use during the 1986 campaign and his inattention to 
governing, culminating in his famous arrest in January 1989). 
350 Victoria Churchville, D.C. Youth Service Chief Quits, WASH. POST, June 8, 1989, at 
C1 (“We must not allow court orders to continue to supplant our own initiatives.  What we 
must do is use creative management strategies to make youth services more cost-effective, 
more efficient and more accountable.” (quoting a written statement issued by Barry)). 
351 Cf. supra Part IV.A.1 (profiling the District’s first-generation administrators). 
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Much later, Mayor Williams created his Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform.
353
  Mayor Williams’s action 
aligned with his broader effort to reclaim the vast powers the District had 
lost to institutional reform lawsuits.
354
  The commission took a broad view 
of its mandate and boldly recommended the closure of Oak Hill.
355
  At least 
initially, the administration appeared to have more interest in ending the 
lawsuit than in extensive juvenile justice reform.
356
  Still, the commission’s 
recommendations retained an independent vitality; politically, the mayor 




As far as juvenile corrections litigation is concerned, the single most 
productive action a chief executive can take is the appointment of a capable 
agency director who will embrace and implement reform.  So it is worth 
noting that the District only reluctantly hired Schiraldi; it first offered the 
 
352 One might also conclude that the government’s interest in managing long-term risks 
(such as the possibility that court supervision beginning in 1986 could continue through 
2011 and beyond) is similar to its interest in caring for incarcerated youths, in that neither 
interest has an electorally important constituency. 
353 Williams created the commission at the urging of prominent Washington lawyer 
Charles F.C. Ruff, who had served as the District’s corporation counsel in the mid-1990s.  
RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 8, 10. 
354 “Williams (D) has made the return of city agencies from judicial supervision to full 
local control a top goal of his administration.”  Sewell Chan, Study Panel Backs Closing of 
Oak Hill, WASH. POST, July 25, 2001, at B1 (disclosing that the Blue Ribbon Commission 
appointed by Mayor Williams would recommend closing Oak Hill, and quoting a deputy 
mayor’s tentative statement that the administration “is open to all recommendations from the 
commission”). 
355 The Annie E. Casey Foundation funded the commission’s paid staff.  RYAN & 
SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 19–20.  The commission’s chair, Eugene N. Hamilton, was a 
former Chief Judge of the D.C. Superior Court; he described the commission’s purpose as 
follows: 
The vested interest in the existing system is one of the most substantial obstacles to change and 
improvement . . . .  We’re out looking for the best solutions for the children of the District of 
Columbia, a system that treats them in the most humane fashion during the time they’re in the 
juvenile justice system and which is most preventive on the front end and most rehabilitative on 
the back end. 
Chan, supra note 354, at B1–B4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
356 See D.C. AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE D.C. BAR, STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE BLUE 
RIBBON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH REHABILITATION ACT OF 2004 (Mar. 17, 2004), 
available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/sections/district_of_columbia_affairs/
statements/juvenile.cfm (“Nearly three years have elapsed and virtually none of the 
Commission’s recommendations have been adopted.”). 
357 See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 4–5. 
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job to three other candidates who were unlikely to attempt the reforms 
Schiraldi envisioned.
358
  Finally, it must be remembered that the executive 
actions that most promoted reform are also examples in which events 
differed substantially from the executive’s apparent intentions.  By 
implication, the chief executive’s control of the government is far more 
tenuous than theorists of institutional reform litigation commonly suppose. 
G. EPILOGUE 
This Comment’s consideration of juvenile correctional reform in the 
District of Columbia has focused almost exclusively on conditions that led 
to the lawsuit and efforts to reform the system between 2005 and 2009.  
Both the judiciary and actors within the political branches are capable of 
advancing reform—but not without difficulty.  However, the political 
branches are more likely than a court to second-guess their own support for 
reform.  To underscore that point, this epilogue outlines the turbulent events 
of 2010, a year in which the agency’s leadership disintegrated. 
At the beginning of 2010, Schiraldi left DYRS to accept a job as 
director of prisons and probation in New York City.
359
  Schiraldi was 
succeeded by his top aide, Marc Schindler, and the special arbiter 
commended the agency for a smooth leadership transition that sustained 
and in some respects improved the agency’s performance.360  But Schindler 
was appointed director on an interim basis, without being nominated for 
 
358 See Michael Bochenek & Marc Schindler, Op-Ed, Wrong Man for the Job, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 26, 2003, at B8 (criticizing District officials who made Lamont Flanagan their top 
candidate, in light of his eleven-year record as director of the Baltimore City Jail); see also 
Theola Labbé, Behind Oak Hill’s Fences, Violence and Uncertainty, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 
2004, at B1 (reporting the city administrator’s statement that the District had sought 
unsuccessfully to lure Leonard Dixon from the juvenile detention center in Wayne County, 
Michigan).  According to Marc Schindler, Jasper Ormond of the District’s probation agency 
was also offered the job but declined. 
Notably, a committee selected reformer Jerome Miller to lead the Massachusetts youth 
corrections agency, defying the governor’s wishes.  See MILLER, supra note 6, at 34 
(“Governor Sargent bluntly told me I wasn’t his first choice.”). 
359 E.g., Editorial, A D.C. Reformer Departs, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2009, at A26 (noting 
that Schiraldi “was both hailed and vilified for his emphasis on rehabilitating, rather than 
confining, juveniles convicted of crimes” and recognizing that the agency had made both 
“dramatic improvements” and “serious missteps”). 
360 The Special Arbiter’s Report to the Court Regarding Defendants’ Progress Toward 
Meeting Certain Requirements of the Revised Final Approved Amended Comprehensive 
Work Plan at 3, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 
2010). 
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council confirmation.
361
  Although Mayor Fenty “showed enormous resolve 
in backing Mr. Schiraldi,” Schindler’s interim status foreshadowed an 




By the summer of 2010, the agency endured a storm of media criticism 
rivaling the exposures of the agency’s abuses in the 1980s.  First, a tragic 
and brazen shooting, which killed three teenagers and injured six others, 
was initially linked to a teenager in DYRS custody who had run away from 
a community-based group home.
363
  Though it was later proven that the 
teenager had no involvement in the shooting, media coverage of the 
incident severely damaged the agency’s reputation.364  Later, three eighteen-
year-old youths under DYRS supervision were charged with murdering the 
popular principal of a D.C. public school.
365
  Finally, Washington Post 
columnist Colbert King demanded in frequent opinion pieces that DYRS 
stop coddling young offenders and return to a tougher approach.
366
 
Despite the headlines, youth advocates, academics, and counsel to the 
Jerry M. plaintiffs each urged Fenty to nominate Schindler to lead the 
agency on an ongoing basis.
367
  But Peter Nickles, the District’s attorney 
general and a longtime Fenty confidant, soured on DYRS management and 
its perceived laxity toward youths, according to a memo he wrote that was 




361 Mayor’s Order 2010-23, Appointment: Interim Director, Department of Youth 
Rehabilitation Services, 57 D.C. Reg. 1275 (Feb. 5, 2010). 
362 Editorial, A D.C. Reformer Departs, supra note 359, at A26. 
363 The news media published extensive coverage of the shooting, including the 
Washington Post’s two-part, front-page series.  See Paul Duggan, Nine Days: The Story 
Behind the Southeast Shootings, WASH. POST, June 3, 2010, at A1; Paul Duggan, Steely 
Determination, Deadly Retaliation, WASH. POST, June 4, 2010, at A1. 
364 See, e.g., Henri Cauvin, Fenty Picks New Chief of Juvenile Justice, WASH. POST, July 
20, 2010, at B1. 
365 Editorial, A Shrouded Justice System: Betts Murder Raises Questions About How 
D.C., Courts Handle Young Offenders, WASH. POST, May 7, 2010, at A26. 
366 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 153 & 284. 
367 See, e.g., Cauvin, supra note 364, at B1 (referring to Schindler’s supporters outside 
the administration); Testimony of Peter Edelman before the D.C. Council, Committee on 
Human Services, June 14, 2010 (on file with the author); Letter from Alan A. Pemberton, 
attorney, Covington & Burling, LLP to Adrian Fenty, Mayor, D.C. (June 22, 2010) (on file 
with the author) (“On behalf of Plaintiffs’ counsel in the Jerry M. case, I write to urge you to 
appoint Marc Schindler as the permanent director of DYRS.  He has our unequivocal 
support.”). 
368 See PETER J. NICKLES, MEMORANDUM TO HON. ADRIAN M. FENTY, MAYOR, REVIEW OF 
DYRS RECORDS REGARDING COMMITTED YOUTH ARRESTED FOR MURDER OR ASSAULT WITH 
INTENT TO MURDER IN 2009–2010, at 6 (May 20, 2010) available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/dyrs_report_oag.pdf (examining fewer than two 
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Finally, Fenty fired Schindler and replaced him with Robert Hildum, a 
prosecutor who believed that New Beginnings was much too small and that 
more youths should be confined in locked custody.
369




The abrupt firing of Schindler occurred at a time when Fenty’s 
campaign for reelection sputtered.
371
  There is circumstantial evidence that 
Fenty’s campaign strategy to win the Washington Post’s support influenced 
his decision to fire Schindler.  As the election grew closer, Fenty’s electoral 
hopes increasingly relied on receiving overwhelming support from white 
and affluent neighborhoods, where the Washington Post’s endorsement is 
believed to carry the greatest weight.
372
  Alternatively (or simultaneously), 
Fenty may have concluded from accounts such as Nickles’s memo that a 
change in policy or personnel was needed.   
In either case, Fenty fired Schindler the day before meeting with the 
Post editorial board to seek the newspaper’s endorsement.373  Columnist 
King quickly praised Schindler’s dismissal in a Post op-ed, concluding: 
“I’ve written more than 30 columns critical of DYRS since 2007.  Fenty 
can’t say he wasn’t warned.  Credit him with finally acting.”374  The same 
column referenced Nickles’s memo and explained, “Fenty was confronted 
 
dozen cases and concluding that “systemic” problems “seem to be related to a lack of 
supervision, guidance, documentation, and overall management of the DYRS program”); cf. 
DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS. (D.C.), UNDATED MEMORANDA ADDRESSING THE REPORT’S 
METHODOLOGY AND CORRECTING THE REPORT’S FACTUAL MISSTATEMENTS, available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/dyrs_response.pdf. 
369 See, e.g., Cauvin, supra note 364, at B1; Jeffrey Anderson & Matthew Cella, ‘Anti-
Prison’ at Root of DYRS Problems, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/21/anti-prison-at-root-of-dyrs-
problems/?page=all (quoting Hildum). 
370 E.g., Cauvin, supra note 364, at B1. 
371 Mike DeBonis, Analysis, After ’06 Landslide, an Apparent Reversal, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 30, 2010, at B1. Although public confidence in government performance reached 
record highs, a large portion of the District’s residents, especially in the black community, 
perceived Fenty as aloof.  Id. 
372 Id.; see Alan Suderman, Posting Up, WASH. CITY PAPER (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:24 PM), 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/looselips/2011/12/14/posting-up/ (supposing 
that the city’s richest, whitest ward “is probably home to the most Post editorial readers”). 
373 See Mike DeBonis, DeMorning DeBonis: July 21, 2010, WASH. POST (July 21, 2010, 
1:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/2010/07/demorning_debonis_july_21_
2010.html (stating that Fenty met with the editorial board on July 20). 
374 Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, D.C.’s Long-Overdue Juvenile Justice Shakeup, WASH. POST, 
July 24, 2010, at A13. (“Woefully misinformed are those who claim that Mayor Adrian 
Fenty’s removal this week of Marc Schindler as interim director of the Department of Youth 
Rehabilitation Services, and the departure of two Schindler deputies, are a setback for 
juvenile reforms.”). 
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with overwhelming evidence of serious and recurring DYRS management 
problems that threaten public safety.  He reacted, as a chief executive 
should.”375  Fenty indeed received the Post’s endorsement, but it was not 
enough to save the campaign.
376
 
The new mayor, Vincent Gray, chose not to retain Hildum; instead he 
nominated Neil Stanley, the DYRS general counsel, to run the agency.
377
  
So far, Stanley has expressed support for a more careful balance of 
rehabilitation and discipline.
378
  For his part, King has continued to rail 
against leniency towards delinquent youths and pilloried Stanley as “Vinny 
Schiraldi-lite.”379  In a public hearing, the new chairman of the committee 
overseeing DYRS complained that the agency provided a “rest home for 
young thugs.”380  Despite testimony in support of Stanley’s nomination 
from the Jerry M. plaintiffs’ counsel, the committee recommended 
disapproving it and the nomination ultimately was “deemed approved” 
without action by the full council.
381
 
From here, the District’s juvenile justice reforms can persist, stall, or 
regress.  This Part has shown that elected officials and their appointees can 
make great changes in this field—in other words, that political actors can 
drive reform.
382
  But political success can be fragile. 
 
375 Id. 
376 Tim Craig & Nikita Stewart, D.C. Mayor’s Race: Voters Appear to Embrace 
Conciliatory Style of Governing, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2010, at A1; Editorial, A Vote for 
Adrian Fenty, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2010, at A18; see also Fred Hiatt, Op-Ed, How We 
Endorse, and Why, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2006, at A17 (mentioning King’s important role 
on the editorial board with respect to District election endorsements). 
377 See Director of the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services Neil A. Stanley 
Confirmation Resolution of 2011, P.R. 19-128 (introduced Mar. 22, 2011) (on file with the 
author) (introduced at the mayor’s request). 
378 See Tom Howell Jr., DYRS Hearing Probes Agency’s Internal Friction, WASH. TIMES 
(May 7, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/7/dyrs-hearing-probes-
agencys-internal-friction/. 
379 Colbert I. King, With New Beginnings, Same Old DYRS, WASH. POST, June 3, 2011, 
at A13. 
380 Howell, supra note 378 (quoting Councilmember Jim Graham). 
381 See COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON P.R. 19-128, at 1–2 (July 
8, 2011). 
382 The Missouri Division of Youth Services has built and maintained the nation’s model 
juvenile justice system while “sustain[ing] political support for nearly three decades under 
governors from both political parties—including tough-on-crime conservatives such as 
former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, who served as Missouri’s governor from 
1985–93.”  MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 12. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment tells the story of a consent decree that could not by 
itself fix a broken system.  What does it mean for the court and the parties 
in a future juvenile corrections lawsuit? 
When adjudicating a single delinquency case, the conscientious 
juvenile court judge seeks to understand why a youth has offended and how 
he can be rehabilitated.
383
  So it would be natural for the Jerry M. court to 
closely oversee compliance with a highly detailed consent decree, as if the 
defendant’s rehabilitation is complete when the defendant complies with 
each term of the decree.  That judicial effort was admirable, but it was not 
effective. 
Instead of treating the law-breaking government like a delinquent 
child, a better approach would treat the law-breaking government as a fully 
capable adult who ought to act responsibly.  That means a consent decree 
should be focused, setting the fewest possible requirements needed to fulfill 
the constitutional and statutory rights of the youths in the agency’s care.  A 
responsible government agency figures out on its own how to do its work. 
What would this look like in practice?  One contemporary remedial 
injunction is a model of simplicity.  In Brown v. Plata, after a consent 
decree failed to bring about the desired changes, the plaintiffs and the court 
required California to meet a population cap to satisfy the inmates’ Eighth 
Amendment right to medical care.
384
  But the parties resisted the temptation 
to dictate how the state must satisfy the target.
385
  The injunction focuses on 
a single, clearly defined result and preserves the defendants’ flexibility in 
meeting it. 
This minimalist approach can be tailored to meet an agency’s most 
fundamental problem—even one that is difficult to quantify, such as a lack 
of effective leadership.  It may simply be exceedingly rare for a chief 
executive to choose and stand behind a true reformer in the mold of a Mark 
Steward, Jerome Miller, or Vincent Schiraldi.
386
  A remedial injunction, 
then, can assign the plaintiffs an advice-and-consent power over any 
prospective nominee to run the agency; that is, it can bind the chief 
executive to obtain the plaintiffs’ consent to the selection of an agency head 
before the chief executive sends the nomination to the legislature for its 
own advice and consent. 
 
383 See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). 
384 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1923 (2011) (describing the population cap 
imposed by a three-judge panel convened pursuant to the PLRA). 
385 Id. at 1940–41. 
386 See supra text accompanying notes 358–75. 
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Such an injunction would give the plaintiffs a substantial amount of 
leverage, installing them as a selection committee over future appointments.  
But it need not grant the plaintiffs a removal power; instead, the plaintiffs 
would have to live with the person they approved, just as the executive 
must.  At the same time, the looming presence of the plaintiffs would insure 
against an executive’s removal of a capable, reform-minded director. 
In one sense, this is a radical proposal.  Yet to adhere to a highly 
detailed approach that has engendered frustration for decades would be to 
expect “an unwarranted triumph of hope over experience.”387 
 
 
387 LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 115 (D.D.C. 2010) (scolding 
the District for seeking to terminate an institutional reform lawsuit in child welfare). 
